


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**REPORT
of the
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
Upon Being Relieved**



PERIOD 1 JULY 1962 - 30 APRIL 1963

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UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

FF1-2
Serial: 00308 /J101A
30 April 1963

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
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From: Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Chief of Naval Operations (5 copies)

Subj: Report of the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet upon being relieved (U)

Ref: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1948, Article 0506(2)

1. Reference (a) requires each Commander in Chief to submit a comprehensive report of the operations and conditions of his command upon being relieved. The report for the period 1 July 1962 to 30 April 1963 is submitted herewith.
2. This document as a whole is classified as SECRET. However, individual paragraphs have been classified separately according to the highest classification of their contents to facilitate further dissemination of parts as appropriate. Unless otherwise indicated, individual paragraphs are unclassified.



ROBERT L. DENNISON

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CONFIDENTIAL

PART I

GENERAL SUMMARY

A. COMMAND STRUCTURE. There has been no significant change in command structure of the Atlantic Fleet since the submission of the last report. (CONFIDENTIAL)

B. TASKS ASSIGNED. During the period 1 July 1962 to 30 April 1963, the U. S. Atlantic Fleet was assigned the following general tasks:

1. Maintain a state of readiness for offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces and shipping and enemy forces and shipping in support thereof. This includes FBM operations. (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. Defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean sea.
3. Protect sea and air communications throughout the assigned area.
4. Support United States policy.

C. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING CONDUCTED.

1. Operational readiness was maintained by a series of basic, type, intertype, joint, and special exercises relating to areas wherein Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet has responsibilities. Specific operational tasks and requirements were met by deployments and other force generations as required, the most notable being those associated with the Cuban crisis during October/December 1962.

a. Analysis of the operations and exercises conducted and study of the lessons learned have revealed areas in which improvement is needed. Recommendations for improvement for items not within the purview of the Commander in Chief have been submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations.

b. As in past years, the effectiveness of the training program continues to suffer from non-stability of personnel and inadequate numbers of trained personnel to act as instructors. The existing critical shortage of supervisory personnel in many rates continues. Shortly after completion of a training exercise or program, it is necessary to commence all over again and conduct the same basic exercise because personnel trained have either been transferred or separated from the Navy. For this reason the desired state of advanced readiness is seldom attained by individual units. Introduction of more complicated weapons systems aggravates this problem. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. During the period of this report, Atlantic Fleet units participated in the following exercises (more fully described in Part IV):

a. NATO

RIPTIDE THREE
FISH PLAY VII
SWEEP CLEAR VII
NEW BROOM XI

CONFIDENTIAL

b. U.S.

| | |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| (1) Fleet Exercises | (4) Midshipmen Training |
| LANTFLEX 2-62 | LANTMIDCRU 1-63 |
| SPRINGBOARD 63 | LANTMIDCRU 2-63 |
| (2) Antisubmarine Warfare | LANTMIDHUKCRU 63 |
| ASWEX 2-62 | MEDMIDCRU 63 |
| ASWEX 3-62 | SUBLANTMIDCRU 63 |
| (3) Amphibious Exercises | DESLANTMIDCRU 63 |
| PHIBULEX 2-62 | LANTNARMID 63 |
| PHIBTRALEX 3-62 | (5) Miscellaneous |
| PHIBULEX 1-63 | CONVEX 3-62 |
| PHIBTRALEX 1-63 | HARDEX/MINEX 1-62 |
| | UNITAS III |
| | DEEP FREEZE 63 |

D. READINESS FOR WAR

1. For the period of this report, the total number of ships in the Atlantic Fleet are tabulated in Part III. Nine SSBN are operating from the replenishment anchorage in Holy Loch, Scotland. The tenth SSBN is scheduled to deploy in July 1963. Armed with nuclear ballistic missiles, these submarines continue to provide the most ready element of the Fleet's nuclear weapon delivery capability. (SECRET)

2. Introduction of the ASROC nuclear depth bomb charge is adding considerable to the efficiency of the Fleet in ASW. There are now 42 ASROC ships in the LANTFLT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Installation of modern ASW continues to enhance the Fleet capability in this area:
 - a. 58 ships have AN/SQS-23 sonar.
 - b. 13 ships have VDS.
 - c. 17 ships have ASPECT "A".
 - d. 132 ships have MK 32 AWTT.

4. A program to provide much needed, practical, system oriented maintenance training for missile system technicians was instituted with approval of the SAM Training Ship plan. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. Vertical Polaris Missile stowage has been completed and satisfactorily tested in BETELGEUSE. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. Nuclear weapons are positioned at eight (8) modified AUW shops and non-nuclear components only are located at two additional shops. Two (2) other mod-AUW shops are operational but incomplete political arrangements prevent dispersal of weapons to these shops. Two more shops are in final stages of completion. (SECRET)

SECRET

7. Increased Fleet air performance is being realized as older aircraft are replaced and transition to newer models such as the P3, A5, and F4, is accomplished. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. The readiness of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet could be improved by accelerating development, increasing procurement and enlarging the provisions for installation of various equipments in sufficient quantities to cope with the multitudinous problems engendered by the scientific attainments of the Soviet Bloc nations. The following areas require improvement to insure Fleet readiness:

a. Surface-to-air missiles have inadequate range. In addition the number of missiles available are inadequate for logistic back-up. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. The production rate of ASROC MK 28 Mod 1 adaption kits has failed to keep pace with the availability of MK 44 nuclear warheads. This shortage of adaption kits has prevented complete shipfills of MK 17 nuclear depth charges in approximately 20% of the destroyer types; this deficiency has a deleterious effect on ASW readiness. (SECRET)

c. Stock levels of the MK 37-0 torpedo represent only 52% of those required for an initial shipfill. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Serious shortages exist in the MK 43/44 torpedoes, ZUNI, NAPALM, BULLPUP, SIDEWINDER, SPARROW, low drag bombs, and certain items of conventional gun ammunition. Planned production and delivery rates of most of these items through FY 63 will not meet Atlantic Fleet requirements. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. Personnel turn over rate is high. Inexperience among officers in certain areas, particularly in shipboard engineering departments, adversely affects readiness. Lack of supervisory personnel (pay grades E-5 and above) results in designated strikers and junior petty officers filling the billets of senior petty officers.

f. Material readiness of ships is adversely affected by age and obsolescence. Non-standard and out of date equipment is an ever increasing problem as the percentage of unavailable spare parts increases.

g. Lack of airborne and underwater IFF equipment and procedures continues to degrade coordinated SUBMARINE/SURFACE/AIR operations. Early warning and patrol type aircraft are being equipped with MK X (SIF) code read out equipment but no wartime codes have been established. It is considered that all ASW aircraft should be equipped with code read out equipment and wartime codes be established. (SECRET)

h. There is in being no anti-submarine torpedo with a conventional warhead which possesses a significant capability to kill a deep diving, high performance submarine. There is, therefore, a continuing urgent need for the development of an advanced anti-submarine torpedo having the general characteristics of the torpedo EX-10. (CONFIDENTIAL)

i. Mines MK 10-3 and MK 27 are inadequate. These mines should be replaced by the mine MK 57 and a new mobile mine, respectively. (CONFIDENTIAL)

j. No submarine air defense system (SUBAD) currently exists to enable a submarine to destroy aircraft. There is a primary requirement to have a capability against rotary wing aircraft, while the anti-fixed wing weapon is a secondary requirement. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

k. Delays in shore support and harbor facilities are a matter of concern. While effects on readiness are not noticeable at present, failure to provide necessary facilities will seriously affect the readiness of the Fleet in the near future, as new ship types join the Fleet.

l. Reductions in supplies and equipage (S&E) and restricted and technical availability (R&T) funds have forced deferral of some shipboard preventative maintenance and a considerable amount of shipboard corrective maintenance. Increasing deterioration of material readiness will accrue if this situation persists. (CONFIDENTIAL)

E. ADMINISTRATION

1. PERSONNEL

a. There has been a decrease of 5,271 enlisted billets in the overall Atlantic Fleet personnel strength since June 1962 of which only 506 were petty officer billets. A decrease in on board reenlistments of 5.7% since June 1962 has lowered the manning level of petty officers by 7.0%; however, overall manning level has increased by 0.7%.

b. Low reenlistment rates of first term personnel, and the resultant personnel instability, are major factors affecting unit and fleet readiness.

c. The number of ratings considered critical due to shortages has increased from 25 to 33 during the past eight months. The distribution of personnel in these ratings to meet requirements is a continuing critical problem.

2. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES. The religious needs of personnel of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet were provided for by one hundred ninety-eight (198) chaplains and augmented by the efforts of many dedicated laymen participating in the fleet-wide religious lay leader program. The moral stature of fleet personnel is excellent.

3. DISCIPLINE. The state of discipline in the Atlantic Fleet is good.

4. DENTAL. Dental care administered in the LANTFLT activities during the Fiscal Year 1963 was similar in scope to that of previous years. Inservice training of dental technicians, preventive dentistry, oral hygiene lectures, and a closer LANTFLT Dental Officer - Force Dental Officer relationship have been important contributions to the LANTFLT dental service. Intensification of dental service has been the keynote. Dental health of LANTFLT personnel can be classed as very good.

5. MEDICAL. The health of personnel of the Fleet continues to be excellent. Scattered reports of established diagnosis of Tuberculosis continue to be received, and, as in the past, are usually limited to a single case in each instance. Vigilant follow-up of all contacts and prescribed preventive medical measures were instituted in each case. Minor outbreaks of gastroenteritis have occurred in Fleet units. In most instances, admission to the sick list was unnecessary, but when indicated, admissions were usually for less than 24 hours. The only exception was the 219 cases of Acute Gastroenteritis reported by the USS BOSTON for the period of 9 October through 16 October 1962. A total of 26 patients were admitted to the sick list. Suspected attack rate of unreported cases among the crew was estimated to be about 50% by the Medical Officer aboard the BOSTON.

6. PUBLIC INFORMATION

a. During the period of this report, 1 July 1962 to 30 April 1963, the Fleet Information Office has continued to emphasize the Navy's public information objectives. Through close cooperation with the Chief of Information, Naval District Commandants and subordinate commands, considerable public recognition of the Navy has been achieved. Photo and news releases issued by the Fleet Information Office during this period numbered 197. Subject matter included Fleet operations, training, and special events on the Fleet headquarters level and does not include material directed for release on the subordinate level.

b. During the past year, numerous Atlantic Fleet ships have been host to local and national news representatives of all media. Major news coverage was arranged for such events as the Project Mercury Program. Fleet Home Town News releases were prepared on personnel reporting for duty to the Flag Administrative Unit, Atlantic Fleet, in addition to releases on meritorious masts, awards, and advancements. Special effort was made to obtain coverage of Navy news items in industrial and institutional house organs. The Fleet Information Office averaged 30 news queries a week from local and national news media concerning Atlantic Fleet units and their activities. Six press conferences were arranged for local and national news media representatives, the majority held during or shortly after the Atlantic Fleet naval quarantine of Cuba in the fall of 1962. Wide coverage of the Navy's role in national defense was facilitated by these press conferences.

c. Public information annexes for operation plans and orders of the Commander in Chief and subordinate commanders were prepared as required. These annexes provided public information guidance for training exercises, special demonstrations and unusual cruises, such as UNITAS III and SOLANT AMITY IV.

d. The Photographic Section of the Fleet Information Office provided extensive coverage of all news events of local, national, and international interest, including visits by U.S. and foreign dignitaries. In cooperation with the Atlantic Fleet Mobile Photographic Unit, wide coverage was obtained in both still and motion picture photography of all newsworthy events during the fiscal year. Over 27,000 photographs were processed by the lab, including 8"x10" photos for release to news media, 35mm color slides, lantern slides and other miscellaneous size prints.

7. ATHLETICS AND RECREATION. The Atlantic Fleet Region Athletic Program has been extremely competitive and maximum individual and team participation is being realized. Physical fitness standards are being met and the over-all Athletic Fleet Sports and physical fitness programs are considered most worthwhile.

8. LEADERSHIP. There is an encouraging trend in the dynamic way in which leadership improvement and training have continued apace in the context of Fleet operations. The initial ground breaking stage has definitely been passed. The program, the goals, and the means are now general knowledge from the first-line supervisors on up. Many of the results do not readily lend themselves to statistical analysis. But those results which are measurable as well as the types of problems being encountered indicate a second stage or follow-up type development. With growing experience in the theoretical study of leadership has come more reliance on mature judgment and values and less reliance on readily available statistics.

F. INTELLIGENCE.

1. The following activities of the Intelligence Division of Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet are reported:

a. 401 submarine contacts were received and analyzed. Of these, 139 (35%) were evaluated as U. S. or friendly submarines, judged to be non-submarine, or were determined to contain insufficient evidence to justify classification. Of the remaining, the following classifications were assigned:

(1) Possible submarine - 66 (16%).

(2) Probable submarine - 27 (07%).

(3) Positive submarine - 169 (42%).

Of interest is the large number of positive contacts reported in the Atlantic area in 1962. Most of these positive contacts were obtained during the Soviet Fleet Exercise or during the Cuban quarantine operations. (SECRET)

2. Increased importance laid on intelligence relative to Soviet Naval and Merchant shipping in the Atlantic Area. (SECRET)

3. Increased intelligence support for forces afloat required as a result of Soviet Long Range Air Force overwater reconnaissance. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Intelligence support for Polaris submarines. (SECRET)

5. Two special intelligence estimates on Cuba were prepared. (SECRET)

6. Caribbean Ground Order of Battle published. (SECRET)

7. The Atlantic Intelligence Estimate for Planning reissued. (SECRET)

8. Plans for a new Atlantic Intelligence Center approved.

9. Intelligence Studies in support of Polaris and CVA targeting. (SECRET)

G. WAR PLANS

1. CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 201-60 remains in effect as the basic emergency war plan for the Atlantic Fleet and supports CINCLANT OPLAN 200-62. This plan has been kept current by issuing changes as required. The plan provides for the wartime responsibilities of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet in his dual capacity as the Commander in Chief of the naval component of the Atlantic Command and as a Fleet Commander in Chief in the basic U. S. Navy organization under the Chief of Naval Operations. Those portions of the plan which CINCLANTFLT carries out under CNO are based upon the NCP and other directives issued by CNO. Those portions of the plan which CINCLANTFLT carries out under the operational command of the Commander in Chief Atlantic are based on CINCLANT OPLAN 200-62. The plan is in consonance with NATO plans and specifies tasks to be performed in NATO war and national tasks which must be performed in the event:

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- a. SACLANT is delayed in assuming control;
- b. NATO fails to function; or
- c. The U. S. should decide to take unilateral action.

The plan also provides for the orderly assignment of national forces until the NATO military organization commences to function. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. In addition to the basic emergency war plan, CINCLANTFLT prepares supporting Cold War and Contingency Operation plans in support of CINCLANT and other military commands which require Atlantic Fleet forces to carry out their mission. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. CINCLANTFLT OPORD 1-62 is the basic operation order for the Atlantic Fleet. It provides guidance to the Atlantic Fleet for the discharge of CINCLANTFLT responsibilities in peace, cold war, limited war, and general war. It is supplementary to CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 201-60 rather than a substitute therefore and is in consonance with the basic war plan. (CONFIDENTIAL)

H. NATO RELATIONSHIPS

1. Relationships with NATO commands has been excellent throughout this reporting period. Close liaison in planning matters between the SACLANT staff and the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/CINCWESTLANT staff has continued.

2. In August 1962, a change in the designation of Commander Fleet Air Wings North Atlantic occurred. At this time, with the concurrence of SACLANT, CINCLANTFLT designated the Commander Barrier Forces Atlantic as COMFAIRWINGSNORLANT vice Commander Fleet Air Wing Thre. The Commander Barrier Forces, Atlantic retains his designation as Island Commander, Iceland. (CONFIDENTIAL)

I. **CONCLUSIONS.** By vigorous, intensive training of new personnel and continued effort on the part of all hands, the U. S. Atlantic Fleet has so far been able to meet satisfactorily its assigned commitments. The state of readiness and training of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet is such, that the fleet, within the limits of forces assigned, is presently capable of carrying out its mission. Nevertheless, there is a certain amount of risk involved because of the tendency to become inured to the fact that these capabilities have been demonstrated over a protracted period without incident. Therefore, more effective measures are urgently required to contribute further to the reduction of material deficiencies and to improve the quantity and quality of personnel available to the fleet, especially in the petty officer ratings. Every effort within the purview of the Fleet Commander in Chief is being made to accomplish this. (CONFIDENTIAL)

PART II

COMMAND STRUCTURE

A. U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET ORGANIZATION

1. The United States Atlantic Fleet is both a component of the Atlantic Command and also an operating force of the U. S. Navy. CINCLANTFLT functions in a dual capacity as a naval component commander under CINCLANT and as a naval commander under CNO for matters relating to personnel, administration, training, logistics, communications, and other matters of uniservice interest; and as commander of forces assigned to the Atlantic Fleet by CNO.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION. The administrative organization of ships and aircraft of the Atlantic Fleet into squadrons, divisions, wings, and groups and other units is as prescribed by CNO. The detailed administrative organization of the Atlantic Fleet is published quarterly by CINCLANTFLT and includes the following commanders:

| <u>COMMAND</u> | <u>COMMAND CATEGORY</u> |
|---|-------------------------|
| Commander SECOND Fleet | Operational |
| Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Operational |
| Commander Submarine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Operational and Type |
| Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Type |
| Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Operational and Type |
| Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic | Operational and Type |
| Commander Mine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Operational and Type |
| Commander Cruiser/Destroyer Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Type |
| Commander Service Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Type |
| Commander Ocean Sub-Area, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Sub-Area |
| Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier | Sub-Area |
| Commander South Atlantic Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Sub-Area |
| U. S. Commander Eastern Atlantic | Sub-Area |
| Commander Eastern Sea Frontier | Sub-Area |
| Commander Training Command, U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Support |
| Commander Naval Support Force, Antarctica | Support |
| Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force | Support |
| Commander Key West Force | Support |

Type commanders are directly responsible for the administration and training of assigned units with the exception that the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force is responsible to the Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps for the administration of the Fleet Marine Force.

3. TASK ORGANIZATION. There has been no significant changes to the Task Organization of the Atlantic Fleet since submission of the last report.

B. HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHMENT

1. The staff of CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT is an integrated staff with officers of the U.S. Army, U. S. Air Force, and U. S. Marines assigned. Certain designated billets of the staff, including Canadian, RCAF, and British Navy personnel, perform primary duty on the CINCWESTLANT NATO Staff. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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2. The only significant change in the CINCLANT headquarters establishment occurred during the Cuban crisis. On 20 October 1962, LGEN Louis Truman, USA, reported for duty from JTF FOUR as Chief of Staff for Contingency Operations. A contingency staff was formed utilizing personnel from JTF 122 and JTF FOUR. The staff was further augmented by personnel from the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT staff and personnel from other Army, Air Force and Marine commands. The contingency staff was disestablished in December 1962. (SECRET)

PART III

COMPOSITION OF THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

A. SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT AS OF 1 JULY 1962 (I) AND 30 APRIL 1963 (II)

| WARSHIPS | DECREASE INCREASE | | |
|----------|----------------------|-----|----|
| | I | II | |
| CA | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| CAG | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| CG | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| CG(N) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| CC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| CLG | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| CVA | 6 | 5 | -1 |
| CVA(N) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| CVS | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| DD * | 102 | 109 | +7 |
| DDG | 7 | 8 | +1 |
| DDR ** | 20 | 16 | -4 |
| DL | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| DLG | 6 | 7 | +1 |
| DLG(N) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| SS | 55 | 55 | 0 |
| SS(N) | 9 | 9 | 0 |
| SSB(N) | 9 | 11 | +2 |
| TOTAL | 232 | 239 | +7 |

* 3 PACFLT DD East Coast Fram
 ** Includes 4 Ex-DDR

| AUXILIARY SHIPS | DECREASE INCREASE | | |
|--------------------|----------------------|-----|----|
| | I | II | |
| AD | 9 | 9 | 0 |
| AE | 8 | 8 | 0 |
| AF | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| AG | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| AGB | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| AGS | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| AGSS | 10 | 6 | -4 |
| AK | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| AKS | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| AN | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| AO | 19 | 19 | 0 |
| AOG | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| AR | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| ARC | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| ARG | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| ARL | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| ARS | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| ARSD | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| AS | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| ASR | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| ATF | 11 | 11 | 0 |
| AVB | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| AVP | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 112 | 108 | -4 |

| AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS | DECREASE INCREASE | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|----|----|
| | I | II | |
| AGC | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| AKA | 12 | 10 | -2 |
| APA | 9 | 9 | 0 |
| LPH | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| LSD | 12 | 12 | 0 |
| LST | 17 | 18 | +1 |
| TOTAL | 56 | 55 | -1 |

| MINE WARFARE SHIPS | DECREASE INCREASE | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----|---|
| | I | II | |
| EMSF | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MSO | 33 | 33 | 0 |
| MSC | 9 | 9 | 0 |
| MCS | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 44 | 44 | 0 |

| PATROL SHIPS | DECREASE INCREASE | | |
|-----------------|----------------------|----|------|
| | I | II | |
| DE | 32 | 18 | -14* |
| DER | 8 | 8 | 0 |
| EPC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| EPCER | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 45 | 31 | -14 |

* NRT ships reactivated and then deactivated.

| ACTIVE SERVICE CRAFT | DECREASE INCREASE | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|----|---|
| | I | II | |
| AFDB | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| AFDL | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| ARD | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| MSB | 22 | 22 | 0 |
| MSL | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| SST | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| SSX | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| YD | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| YFN | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| YFNFB | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| YOG | 1 | 1 | 0 |

CONFIDENTIAL

| ACTIVE SERVICE CRAFT | | | DECREASE INCREASE - |
|-------------------------|----|----|------------------------|
| | I | II | |
| YC | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| YRDM | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| YTM | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 52 | 52 | 0 |

| SHIPS ALL TYPES | I | II | DECREASE |
|--------------------|-----|-----|----------|
| | | | INCREASE |
| TOTAL | 541 | 529 | -12 |

| NAVAIRLANT AIRCRAFT | | | DECREASE |
|------------------------|-----|-----|----------|
| | I | II | INCREASE |
| CVG | 8 | 7 | -1 |
| CVSG | 7 | 6 | -1 |
| FAETU | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| HAW | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VA | 25 | 23 | -2 |
| VAH | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| VAP | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VAW | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| VF | 16 | 14 | -2 |
| VFP | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| HS | 7 | 6 | -1 |
| VP (ML) | 18 | 14 | -4 |
| VP (MS) | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| VQ | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VR | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VRC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VRF | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VS | 20 | 11 | -9 |
| VU | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| VW | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| VX | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 129 | 109 | -20 |

| FMFLANT AIRCRAFT | | | DECREASE |
|-------------------------|----|----|----------|
| | I | II | INCREASE |
| HS | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| H&HS | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| H&MS | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| MAG (HMR) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MAG VMF/VMF (AW) VMA | 4 | 4 | 0 |
| MABS | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| MARS | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MACS | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| MASS | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MWHG | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MWSC | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VMF (AW) | 3 | 4 | +1 |
| VMF | 3 | 2 | -1 |
| VMA | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| VMCJ | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VMO | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VMR | 1 | 0 | -1 |
| VMGR | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| HMM | 4 | 5 | +1 |
| HMH | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| VMT | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MARTSAT | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| MATCU | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| LAAM BN | 0 | 1 | +1 |
| TOTAL | 52 | 53 | +1 |

| OTHER UNITS | | | DECREASE |
|----------------------------------|---|----|----------|
| | I | II | INCREASE |
| Mobile Construction Battalion | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Cargo Handling Battalion | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| LORAC Support Team | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Tactical Air Control Squadron | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Underwater Demolition Unit | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Destroyer Development Group | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Submarine Development Group | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Test and Evaluation Detachment | 3 | 3 | 0 |

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| OTHER UNITS | I | II | DECREASE INCREASE |
|----------------------------------|---|----|----------------------|
| | | | |
| Fleet Mobile Target Repair Unit | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Naval Beach Group | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Beach Jumper Group | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Mobile Ordnance Service Unit | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Mobile Electronic Technical Unit | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Mobile Photographic Unit | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Minecraft Support Unit | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| GM Evaluation Detachment | 1 | 1 | 0 |

B. **FLEET MARINE FORCE ATLANTIC.** The composition of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic Aviation and Ground Units as of 1 July 1962 and 30 April 1963 is as follows:

| 1 JULY 1962 | 30 APRIL 1963 |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Fleet Marine Force Atlantic | Fleet Marine Force Atlantic |
| Hdqtrs and Service Bn., FMFLANT | Hdqtrs and Service Bn., FMFLANT |
| Second Marine Division | Second Marine Division |
| 2nd Marines (3 Battalions) | 2nd Marines (3 Battalions) |
| 6th Marines (3 Battalions) | 6th Marines (3 Battalions) |
| 8th Marines (3 Battalions) | 8th Marines (3 Battalions) |
| 10th Marines (4 Battalions) | 10th Marines (4 Battalions) |
| H&SCo, 1stBn, 22nd Marines | H&SCo, 1stBn, 22nd Marines |
| Headquarters Bn., 2nd MARDIV | Headquarters Bn., 2nd MARDIV |
| 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion | 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion |
| 2nd Service Battalion | 2nd Service Battalion |
| 2nd Pioneer Battalion | 2nd Pioneer Battalion |
| 2nd Medical Battalion | 2nd Medical Battalion |
| 2nd Motor Transport Battalion | 2nd Motor Transport Battalion |
| 2nd Anti-Tank Battalion | 2nd Anti-Tank Battalion |
| Force Troops FMFLANT | Force Troops FMFLANT |
| Headquarters Company, Force Troops | Headquarters Company, Force Troops |
| 2nd Force Service Regiment | 2nd Force Service Regiment |
| 2nd Tank Battalion | 2nd Tank Battalion |
| 2nd AMTRAC Battalion | 2nd AMTRAC Battalion |
| 8th Communication Battalion | 8th Communication Battalion |
| 8th Engineer Battalion | 8th Engineer Battalion |
| 8th Motor Transport Battalion | 8th Motor Transport Battalion |
| 2nd Force Recon Company | 2nd Force Recon Company |
| 2nd Composite Radio Company | 2nd Composite Radio Company |
| 2nd ANGLICO | 2nd ANGLICO |
| 2nd Topographic Company | 2nd Topographic Company |
| 2nd Bridge Company | 2nd Bridge Company |
| 2nd Field Artillery Group | 2nd Field Artillery Group |
| 2nd Hospital Company | 2nd Hospital Company |
| 2nd Sep Surgical Company | 2nd Sep Surgical Company |
| 2nd Dental Company | 2nd Dental Company |
| 4th Dental Company | 4th Dental Company |
| 12th Dental Company | 12th Dental Company |
| 2nd Counter Intelligence Team | 2nd Counter Intelligence Team |
| 4th Counter Intelligence Team | 4th Counter Intelligence Team |
| 2nd Photo Interp Team | 2nd Photo Interp Team |

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1 JULY 1962

2nd Int Trans Team
Second Marine Aircraft Wing
Marine Training Squadron One
Marine Composite Squadron Two
Marine Wing Hdqtrs Group Two
Marine Wing Service Group 27
Marine Aircraft Group 14
Marine Aircraft Group 24
Marine Aircraft Group 26
Marine Aircraft Group 31
Marine Aircraft Group 32
Hdqtrs Squadron FMFLANT

30 APRIL 1963

2nd Int Trans Team
Second Marine Aircraft Wing
Marine Training Squadron One
Marine Composite Squadron Two
3d LAAM Bn.
Marine Wing Hdqtrs Group Two
Marine Wing Service Group 27
Marine Aircraft Group 14
Marine Aircraft Group 24
Marine Aircraft Group 26
Marine Aircraft Group 31
Marine Aircraft Group 32
Hdqtrs Squadron FMFLANT

C. FLEET BASES

1. GENERAL

a. Units of the Operating Forces of the Navy received support from the following overseas bases, consistent with the requirements of the missions assigned each base:

Naval Station, Argentia
Naval Station, Bermuda
Naval Station, Iceland
Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads
Naval Station, San Juan
Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay
Naval Station, Trinidad
Naval Air Facility, Lajes
Naval Station, Keflavik

These units also received support from their normal CONUS bases and from those in the CINCUSNAVEUR area.

b. TEN YEAR PLAN FOR PUERTO RICO COMPLEX. The orderly development of naval facilities and operating areas in the Puerto Rico area necessary to support Atlantic Fleet requirements commenced with a harbor dredging project funded in FY 63. In addition, the Secretary of the Navy initiated and approved an Engineering Evaluation Report for the Roosevelt Roads Complex which supports the CINCLANTFLT Ten Year Plan. Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force is proceeding with plans to install an underwater test range at St. Croix, V.I.

c. THE NAVAL BASE, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA. Fleet operations during the Cuban crisis were supported in an outstanding manner. Facilities and services were entirely adequate to service fleet units. Extensive ground fortifications have been completed during this report period. One Mobile Construction Battalion is continuously deployed, and a second MCB is in an alert status for immediate deployment (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. POLARIS REPLENISHMENT ANCHORAGES. The Holy Loch, Scotland anchorage has been in continuous operation in support of SSBNs. CONUS sites have been investigated in the Narragansett Bay, Norfolk, Virginia and Charleston, S.C., areas. Third and fourth replenishment anchorage sites will be selected from these areas. (SECRET)

e. ATLANTIC UNDERSEAS TEST AND EVALUATION CENTER. Military command was assigned to the Commander Service Force, Atlantic on 26 December 1962.

f. UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAM TRAINING FACILITY, ST. THOMAS, V.I. Designated as an outlying activity of Naval Station, Roosevelt Roads in August 1962. Naval Construction Forces repaired the former Submarine Base facilities for use by UDT, SEAL and Marine Reconnaissance training.

g. OCEANOGRAPHIC SYSTEM, ATLANTIC. Improvements are underway to expand the system capability. CINCLANTFLT exercises command of the below activities through COMASWFORLANT and under direct military command of COMOCEANSYSLANT.

| | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| NAVFAC, Eleuthra, B.W.I. | NAVFAC, Nantucket, R.I. |
| NAVFAC, Ramey AFB, P.R. | NAVFAC, Lewes, Delaware |
| NAVFAC, San Salvador, B.W.I. | NAVFAC, Hatteras, N.C. |
| NAVFAC, Bermuda | NAVFAC, Antigua |
| NAVFAC, Turks Island, B.W.I. | NAVFAC, Barbados |

2. SHORE STATION DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

a. The tentative Military Construction Component Effective Program Projections FY 64 was reviewed and the CINCLANTFLT Integrated Priority List of military construction projects of direct interest to the Atlantic Fleet was forwarded to CNO on 16 November 1962.

b. Fleet requirements for Atlantic bases have been under constant review to provide up-to-date planning guidance to shore activities. Norfolk, Virginia, Charleston, S.C., Mayport, Florida and Key West, Florida now have revised development plans which reflect fleet requirements.

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PART IV

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

A. EASTERN ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN FORCES

1. CINCLANTFLT is currently committed to provide the following forces to CINCUSNAVEUR and CINCNELM:

| UNITS DEPLOYED | JCS REQUIREMENTS | REMARKS |
|---------------------------------------|---|--|
| <u>Attack Carrier Group</u> | | |
| 2 CVA 2 CA/CAG/CLG 3 DESRON (-) | 2 CVA 2 CA/CAG/CLG 16 DD plus 2-4 DD on Mid-East | 1 CLG homeported Ville Franche. 2 DD maintained on mid- East Patrol. |
| <u>Submarine Group</u> | | |
| 2-4 SS | 2 SS | Rotated 4 times each year. Augmented from time to time. |
| <u>A/S Carrier Group</u> | | |
| 1 CVS | Yes (Intermittent basis) | A/S Carrier Group deployment normally scheduled during sum- mer months to coin- cide with midshipmen lift requirements. |
| <u>Amphibious Group</u> | | |
| 1 BLT (Reinforced) | Yes | Rotated 3 times each year. |
| 1 AGC | No | Rotated 2 times each year. Standby flag- ship for CINCNELM. |
| 1 APA | 5 Amphibious ships | Rotated three times each year. |
| 1 AKA | | Rotated three times each year. |
| 2 LSD (2 LCU Embarked) | | Rotated three times each year. 1 LSD with HELOS embarked |
| 1-2 LST | | Rotated three times each year. |

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| UNITS DEPLOYED | JCS REQUIREMENTS | REMARKS |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| <u>Mine Group</u> | | |
| 1 MSO Division (4 ships) | Yes | Rotated two times each year. |
| <u>Logistic Support Group</u> | | |
| 4 AO | Logistics as required by attack carrier group. | 1 AO (Fleet) homeported Naples. 3 AO (Fleet) rotated three times each year. |
| 2 AE | Logistics as required by attack carrier group. | 2 AE rotated 3 times each year. |
| 1 AD | Logistics as required by attack carrier group. | Rotated three times each year. |
| 1 AF | Logistics as required by attack carrier group. | On shuttle trip basis, sailing from CONUS every 4-5 weeks. |
| 1 AKS | Logistics as required by attack carrier group. | Homeported Naples. |
| 1 AVB | No | 1 AVB (Aviation support) Homeported Naples. |
| 1 AOG | No | Deployment resumed April 1962. Rotated 3 times each year. |
| <u>Aviation Unit</u> | | |
| 1 AVP | Yes | MIDEASTFOR Flagship rotated 3 times each year. |
| 1 VQ Squadron | No | Homeported Rota. Deployment directed by CNO. |
| 1 VR Squadron | No | Homeported Port Lyautey with a detachment homeported Naples. Deployment directed by CNO. |

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SECRET

| UNIT DEPLOYED | JCS REQUIREMENT | REMARKS |
|-------------------|-----------------|--|
| 1 1/2 VP Squadron | Yes | Rotated. One squadron based Sigonella, one-half squadron based Rota. |

2. The following items concern regular deployments to ELM, including changes which occurred during the period 1 July 1962 - 30 April 1963.

a. In order to maintain a constant level of readiness, carrier strike force reliefs are being conducted in increments according to the following schedule:

1 CVA - February - April - August - October
 1 CA/CAG/CLG/CG/CGN - February and August
 9 DD - every 4 months commencing March 1963
 1-2 AO - every 4 months commencing March 1963
 1 AE - February - April - August - October

b. Two-three DDs report to COMIDEASTFOR on a rotational basis to operate in the MIDEAST area.

c. Lack of sufficient AKS to meet deployment rotation requirements requires one of the two of that type in LANTFLT to be homeported in ELM.

d. COMFAIRMED has been ashore in ELM since May 1955. One AVB, homeported in Naples, is utilized to provide air logistics services.

e. Deployment of an AOG to Mediterranean was resumed in April 1962. Deployment of LSD with embarked HELOS was resumed.

f. CINCLANTFLT has the commitment of maintaining one AVP in the MIDEAST to serve as COMIDEASTFOR flagship.

B. CARIBBEAN READY FORCES

1. During the period covered by this report CINCLANTFLT has (with the exception noted below) maintained in the Caribbean a minimum of one PHIBRON with either a BLT or MEU embarked, one VMF or VMA, and one MINDIV. During the period 6 December to 7 January the Caribbean Ready PHIBRON was maintained in readiness in Norfolk with all heavy expeditionary gear of the associated BLT loaded. The BLT was located at Camp Lejeune in readiness to complete embarkation within four hours of the arrival of shipping. Deployed forces have conducted or participated in amphibious training exercises as noted in paragraph E below. The only interruptions to planned training have resulted from contingency requirements noted in paragraphs F and G. (SECRET)

SECRET

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C. FLEET EXERCISES

1. LANTFLEX 2-62 (LANTMIDCRU 1-62) was underway at the beginning of the fiscal year, having commenced on 4 June. Phase ALPHA included intership exercises, type training including air group operations and carrier qualifications. Phase BRAVO included a small scale task force training including a two day STRIKEX for ships deploying to NELM. Phase CHARLIE was preparation for overseas movement for ships deploying to NELM and type training for remaining ships. Phase DELTA was Atlantic transit and NELM relief, and included warm-up exercises for FALLEX 62. USNA midshipmen were embarked in Phases ALPHA, BRAVO, and CHARLIE. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. SPRINGBOARD 63 commenced on 8 January and continued through 29 March and included type training for LANTFLT units in the Caribbean. (CONFIDENTIAL)

D. MIDSHIPMEN TRAINING

1. A wide variety of afloat and ashore training was conducted during the summer of 1962 for midshipmen from the U. S. Naval Academy and Eastern NROTC units. Over 3000 midshipmen were provided amphibious indoctrination, shipboard training at sea, and indoctrination in destroyers and submarines of the Atlantic Fleet.

2. An exchange program of foreign midshipmen and USNA midshipmen was initiated. Two midshipmen from Chile, Venezuela, Brazil and Peru were trained in Atlantic Fleet ships. Additional exchanges were made in SIXTH fleet ships. A similar program is planned for the summer of 1963.

3. Midshipmen training scheduled for the summer of 1963 follows:

a. LANTMIDCRU 1-63 is conducted by a midshipmen Training Task Group commanded by COMSECONDFLT. 1120 first and third class USNA midshipmen will be trained in Atlantic Fleet ships during the period 20 June - 25 July 1963.

b. LANTMIDCRU 2-63 is conducted in Atlantic Fleet ships during period of 6 June - 31 August for about 700 NROTC 1/c midshipmen contract students. These midshipmen receive their training in the Western Atlantic and Caribbean area.

c. LANTMIDHUKCRU 63 is conducted in ASWFORLANT ships during period of 3 June - 12 September for approximately 1675 NROTC midshipmen 1/c and 3/c. These midshipmen receive their training conducting Hunter/Killer operations in the Western Atlantic.

d. MEDMIDCRU 63 is conducted by CINCLANTFLT and COMSIXTHFLT during period 3 June - 4 September for about 700 USNA/NROTC midshipmen 1/c. These midshipmen receive their training conducting operations with SIXTHFLT ships in the Mediterranean.

e. SUBLANTMIDCRU 63 is conducted in SUBLANT ships during period 6 June - 30 August for about 180 USNA/NROTC midshipmen 1/c. These midshipmen receive their training aboard submarines operating with the Atlantic Fleet.

f. DESLANTMIDCRU 63 is conducted in CRUDESLANT ships during period 6 June - 30 August for about 116 USNA/NROTC midshipmen 1/c and 3/c. These midshipmen receive their training aboard destroyers operating with the Atlantic Fleet

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g. LANTNARMID 63 is an amphibious indoctrination training cruise for midshipmen 2/c during the period 16 June - 17 August. These midshipmen receive their training at the Little Creek Amphibious Base.

E. MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS AND CPX

1. Participation in NATO exercises by LANTFLT forces during the period included:

a. RIP TIDE THREE was a small scale STRIKEX conducted during the period 11-15 August 1962 in the IBERLANT area. COMSTRIKEFLTLANT was the OCE. LANTFLT forces included 2 CVA, 1 CAG, 1 CA, 2 DLG, 4 DDR, 6 DD, 2 AO, 2 AE. French, Portuguese and U.K. forces also participated. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. FALLEX 62 was a large scale CPX 20-28 September 1962 conducted in conjunction with National exercises. This was a NATO-wide exercise that tested NATO War Plans. COMSTRIKFLT flagship (USS NEWPORT NEWS (CA-148)) was the only live participant. All major LANTFLT Headquarters participated in a CPX role. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. SWEEP CLEAR SEVEN was a small scale MINEX held in the CANLANT area from 8-20 October 1962. COMCANLANT was the OCE. LANTFLT forces included 6 MSO, 4 MSC, 1 MCS, 1 AN, 1 EODU Team and 1 VPRON. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. LOOKOUT was a surprise CPX held 13 February 1963 to test the machinery for implementing the transition of earmarked forces from National to NATO control. No live forces participated.

e. NEW BROOM ELEVEN was a small scale ASWEX held 16-25 April 1963 in the WESTLANT area. COMOCEANLANT was the OCE. LANTFLT forces included 1 DL, 5 DE, 3 DD, 1 AE, 3 AO, 4 SS, 1 VPRON. Canadian and U. K. forces also participated. (CONFIDENTIAL)

f. FISH PLAY SEVEN was a small scale SUBEX held in the Eastern Atlantic commencing 22 April and scheduled to conclude 10 May 1963. COMSUBEASTLANT was the OCE. LANTFLT forces included 4 SS, 6 SP2, 4 P3A. Canadian, French, Netherlands and U.K. forces also participated. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. ASWEX 2-62, and ASWEX 3-62 involving 3 ASW carrier groups and 3 submarines were conducted during the periods 26 June - 18 August 1962 and 6 July - 20 August 1962 respectively. Training operations were conducted with midshipmen embarked for LANTMID-HUKCRU. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. CONVEX 3-62 was a convoy training exercise involving combatants and supporting auxiliaries with submarine opposition. It was conducted in LANTFLT operating areas during the period 6-12 July 1962. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. HARDEX/MINEX 1-62 was a harbor defense, mining and mine countermeasures exercise conducted in the Charleston, South Carolina area 22 August - 4 September 1962. Units participating included COMINRON FOUR with 1 MCS, 1 AN, 4 MSC, 4 MSO, 10 MSB, 1 EOD Team, 2 MDAU, 1 SS and 1 PATRON. HARDEFU TWO, utilizing two mobile harbor defense teams, conducted the harbor defense aspects of the exercise.

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a. Charleston was simulated as an overseas Allied harbor in which naval forces assigned by CINCLANTFLT were utilized for harbor defense operations. Mining operations by the enemy were conducted by the PATRON and surface units, and the drill mines planted provided opposition for the mine countermeasure forces. The SS attempted penetration of the off-shore defenses. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. UNITAS III was a clockwise circum-navigation of the South American Continent during the period 23 August - 25 October 1962 planned and conducted by COMSOLANT. ASW operations were conducted with the Navies of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. UNITAS III was terminated 25 October 1962 by CINCLANTFLT due to the worsening situation in the Caribbean. LANTFLT forces involved were 1 DD, 1 DE, 1 SS and an air detachment of 2 P2V and 1 R4Y commanded by COMSOLANT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. DEEP FREEZE 63 was the annual provision of forces and fleet support operations by CINCLANTFLT to support the U. S. scientific program in Antarctica. The operation commenced with the arrival of the first aircraft at McMurdo Station, Antarctica on 15 September 1962 and finished with the departure of the last aircraft in early March 1963.

a. During the austral summer season the support force delivered the required personnel, fuel, stores and equipment for the support of the bases and scientific effort. Additional construction or rehabilitation was effected at each of the main bases, McMurdo, Byrd, Pole and Hallett. Temporary stations were established at several locations for support of scientific field parties.

b. Significant events were the establishment of Eighta Station in the Ellsworth Highlands, a ship expedition in the Palmer Peninsula area to locate a new base site, and the first helicopter flight to the South Pole.

c. Units participating in DEEP FREEZE 63:

(1) LANTFLT - COMNAVSUPPFOR Antarctica (CTF 43) and Staff Antarctic Support Activities (bases), AIRDEVRON SIX, 2 AGB, 1 AKA, CHB ONE (Det.), and MCB EIGHT.

(2) PACFLT - 1 AGB, 1 AOG, 2 DER.

(3) COAST GUARD - 1 WAGB.

(4) MSTS - 1 T-AOG, 2 T-AK.

(5) MATS - 9 C-124.

(6) NEW ZEALAND - 1 Frigate, 1 AOG

(7) U. S. ARMY - 3 Helicopters

7. SS SULPHUR QUEEN which disappeared somewhere off the coast of Florida in January was the subject of an extensive search 20 February - 13 March directed by COMKWESTFOR. CINCLANTFLT forces involved were 1 EPC, 6 MSO employed for 523 hours of underwater search for the hulk of the ship and 17 sorties by MAD configured aircraft utilizing 57 hours flight time. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

8. SOLANT AMITY is the nickname given to an intermittent CINCLANTFLT operation in proximity of the African coast. SOLANT AMITY IV planned and conducted by COMSOLANT commenced 4 March and will continue through 26 May 1963. Visits to African ports are included in the itinerary. The mission of the force is good will visits to African ports, distribution of HANDCLASP material, furtherance of the People-to-People program, and military actions to protect National interests including evacuation of U. S. Nationals if directed. The force consists of 1 LSD and 2 DE under command of COMSOLANT (CTF 88).
(CONFIDENTIAL)

9. PRESUS VISIT COSTA RICA. The President attended a conference with 6 other heads of state at San Jose, Costa Rica 18-20 March. The JCS directed that CINCARIB be basically responsible for the support and sea surveillance effort for protection of the President while in Costa Rica.

a. CINCLANT directed CINCLANTFLT to CHOP the following forces to COMUS-NAVCARIB for the operation:

(1) CTG 83.1 (COMCARDIV 14) in WASP. TG 83.1 WASP (CVS-18), DESRON 12 (5 DD), THETIS BAY (LPH-6). TG 85.1 10 SP2H.

(2) 5 UH34D were embarked in WASP for surveillance operations and for lift of Costa Rican security forces. 10 UH34D were embarked in THETIS BAY for the same purposes plus providing lift for 120 Marines, if necessary.

b. CINCLANTFLT also provided three destroyers on the flight route of the Presidents aircraft for SAR and navigation purposes.

c. USS NORTHAMPTON (CC-1) was deployed to Costa Rican waters during the visit for NECPA support and back-up support for communications. (SECRET)

10. Significant CPX type exercises in which CINCLANTFLT participated during the period included:

a. HIGH HEELS II was a JCS world-wide CPX held during the period 6-28 September 1962. Its purpose was to exercise personnel in their emergency duties, emergency actions procedures, progressive plans, the NUDET and radio active fallout reporting system, continuity of operations and relocation plans of the JCS and all other commands and agencies.
(SECRET)

b. FALLEX 62, as noted in paragraph D. 1. b. above was a large scale NATO CPX conducted in conjunction with HIGH HEELS II. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. SPADE FORK was a U. S. National agency exercise primarily relating to CPX play of Logistic problems in conjunction with HIGH HEELS II and FALLEX 62.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

F. OPERATIONS CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS:

1. Possible threat to the security of the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in connection with Cuban 26th of July celebration resulted in the deployment of the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron with embarked landing force to the Guantanamo Bay operating area on 25 July. This was accompanied by increased security and surveillance measures on the base to include significant air demonstrations over the base commencing on the evening of 25 July. This alert was terminated early on 27 July 1962. (SECRET)

SECRET

2. Potential disorder in Haiti in early August 1962 resulted in reembarkation of the Marine Landing Force aboard the ready Caribbean Amphibious Squadron and discrete deployment of that force to a position for possible rapid employment. In addition a patrol force of two destroyers was ordered to the Gulf of Gonaive. These alert measures were terminated on 14 August. (SECRET)

3. On 14 February 1963 information was received from ALUSNA Santo Domingo and U. S. Coast Guard that members of the leftist FALN organization led by Majors SIMON and RAFALL had seized the Venezuelan motor ship ANZOATEGUI which had departed LA GUAIRA on 12 February 1963. After the government of Venezuela had requested assistance, the JCS directed that a search be conducted for the ship. The estimated position south of the Dominican Republic indicated that the ship might be heading for Cuba. A surface and air barrier was established from Puerto Rico west to the Yucatan Channel by 2 CVS and 12 DD types. Search aircraft from the CVS and land stations covered the water areas from the Lesser Antilles west to the Yucatan Peninsula. The vessel was sighted east of Trinidad, W. I. on 16 February by aircraft and was subsequently kept under surveillance by aircraft and USNS GIBBS and 2 DD dispatched from San Juan until under the control of the Brazilian Navy at Santana Brazil 20 February. A total of 110 sorties requiring 615 flight hours and 43 ship days were expended on the search. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Continued unrest in Haiti in early March led to special alert measures for selected units deployed to the Caribbean. Other than ship visits in response to requests from the U. S. Ambassador, contingency deployments maintained out of sight of land in the Gulf of Gonaive. (SECRET)

G. OPERATIONS RESULTING FROM BUILDUP OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA

1. GENERAL

a. Navy operations in the Cuban crisis covered a broad spectrum. The forces involved conducted surface quarantine operations, participated in photo reconnaissance and surveillance, ASW operations, maintained an Attack Carrier and Amphibious Striking Forces on station. Further, in conjunction with the Fleet Marine Force they were prepared to hold and defend the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (SECRET)

b. Since the scope of Naval operation covered such an extensive area, only significant activity will be reported. The activity considered includes:

Cuban Quarantine Force (TF-136)
Attack Carrier Force (TF-135)
ASW Force Operations
Amphibious Force Operations
Fleet Marine Force Operations
Combined Latin American/U. S. Quarantine Force

While activities associated with the preceding operations were concurrent, each will be described as a distinct situation even though an overlap of participating units did occur in some instances. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SECRET

2. CUBAN QUARANTINE OPERATIONS (CTF-136)

a. On 23 October 1962, the JCS directed the establishment of a blockade of Cuba. This action implemented the Presidential Proclamation of the same day issued on "interdiction of the delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba." (UNCLASSIFIED)

b. On 21 October, in anticipation of the blockade of Cuba, CINCLANTFLT issued Operation Order 45-62. As directed by the JCS and CINCLANT, this order was implemented on 24 October. Subsequently the JCS directed that the word "quarantine" be substituted for "blockade" since the term could be interpreted as an act of war. OPORD 45-62 COMSECONDFLT was designated Quarantine Force Commander (CTF-136). COMASWFOR-LANT in his capacity as CTF 81-83 was directed to conduct air surveillance as requested by (CTF-136). (SECRET)

c. COMSECONDFLT OPORD 1-62 established TF-136 with COMSECONDFLT as CTF-136. The organization was divided into three task groups that remained in effect throughout the quarantine. However, some of the units were relieved in kind as the operation progressed. The Task Force Organization was as follows:

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

CTF 136

| <u>CTG 136. 1</u> | <u>CTG 136. 2</u> | <u>CTG 136. 3</u> |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 1 CA | 1 CVS | 2 AO |
| 1 CLG | 4 DD | 1 AE |
| 2 DLG | | 4 DD |
| 2 DDG | | |
| 2 DDR | | |
| 1 DDG | | |
| 9 DD | | |

Additionally, 5 destroyer type ships assigned COMKWESTFOR intermittently participated in quarantine operations due to their proximity to Havana, the Old Bahama Channel and the Southern approaches to the Straits of Florida. COMCARIBSEAFRON conducted similar operations with DD type assigned in the Windward Passage and along the Southern Coast of Cuba. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Task Force Disposition (23 October - 30/31 October). TF 136. 1 was given station initially on an arc of 500 miles from Cape Maysi, the eastern most extremity of Cuba, from 27-30N, 70-00W to 20-00N, 65-00W. There were 12 stations on this arc with 47 miles between stations. These stations were given the prefix code word (WALNUT). CTG 136. 2 took station to the west of the general center of this arc and CTG 136. 3 operated as necessary to replenish the ships on station. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. Task Force Disposition (30/31 October - 7 November). The original line was effective while at the same time being outside the operational range of Cuban aircraft. Later, it was determined by U. S. aerial reconnaissance that the Cuban Air Force was in a poor state of readiness to launch an attack. Consequently, with the approval of JCS and CINCLANT the quarantine arc was readjusted closer to Cuba, but seaward of the Bahamas chain. The readjustment was accomplished on 30/31 October and the new stations were assigned Code Name "CHESTNUT." (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

f. General Composition of Air Surveillance Units

| | |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| 1 CVS | 22 S2F 14 HSS-2 1 WF-2 |
| CTG 81.5 (Bermuda) | 22 P5M |
| CTG 81.7 | 1 P2V |
| U. S. Air Force | 6 RB-47 4 RB-50 |

Additional aircraft, including P2V, P3V, S2F, etc., were launched from:

| | |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Roosevelt Roads | Guantanamo Bay |
| Bermuda | Azores |
| Argentina | Jacksonville |
| Key West | Norfolk |
| Patuxent River | |

It is estimated that an average of 240 aircraft were directly engaged in the effort to locate and identify ships engaged in the Cuban trade. (CONFIDENTIAL)

g. The search effort in an operation such as this one was a monumental task. An average of about 56 ships, 240 aircraft and some 30,000 personnel were directly engaged in the effort to locate ships inbound for, and later outbound from Cuba. Naval Air Patrol Squadrons and Antisubmarine Warfare Forces Atlantic Fleet provided aircraft to search the ocean approaches to Cuba. At the outset of the quarantine the U. S. Air Force provided six RB-47 aircraft and four RB-50 aircraft to augment and extend Navy search efforts. The six RB-47 aircraft were withdrawn from the effort after about one week of search operations. The Air Force retained the four RB 50 aircraft in quarantine operations on a continuing basis to operate out of the Azores and make daily searches of the Ocean Area out to 400 miles south of the Azores. To search the approximately 4,500,000 square miles of ocean in support of the overall quarantine operation the Navy flew aircraft from such widely separated points as Roosevelt Roads, P. R., Guantanamo Bay, Bermuda, the Azores, Argentina, N. F., Jacksonville, Key West, Norfolk and Patuxent River. Aircraft searches accounted for the identification of over 200 ships of interest to quarantine operations control. By way of contrast, surface ships intercepted only 50 ships of interest. The majority of ships were intercepted by aircraft, then evaluated. Once it was determined the ship was of interest, a surface unit was vectored to intercept. (CONFIDENTIAL)

h. For overall purposes the quarantine can be divided into three phases, as follows:

(1) PHASE I. From 24 October until 4 November. This phase saw many suspicious Soviet ships turn back and never go to Cuba. Other with non-suspicious cargo slowed and even stopped, seemingly awaiting guidance from the Kremlin. Gradually these latter ships proceeded to their ports of destination in Cuba. (CONFIDENTIAL)

At position 26-30N 74-30W as directed by CINCLANTFLT, a boarding party made up of personnel from PIERCE and J. P. KENNEDY went aboard MARUCLA (Leb).

CONFIDENTIAL

examined her papers and inspected the cargo. MARUCLA was found to be carrying no prohibitive material, and was cleared to proceed on her voyage. (CONFIDENTIAL)

(2) PHASE II.

(a) From 5 to 11 November. It was during this phase that CINCLANTFLT promulgated the code name "SCOTCH TAPE" followed by a numeral to designate a suspect ship which might warrant special attention. This code name facilitated unclassified reference to a particular merchant ship. During this phase eleven "SCOTCH TAPE" ships were observed out-bound from Cuba. Difficulty was encountered in contacting the Russian ships carrying the missiles out of Cuba. The Soviet delegation to the U. S. had provided the United States with the names of nine (9) Soviet ships, the number of missiles that each ship would carry and the date of departure from Cuban port. In turn, the United States, through the Secretary of State provided the Soviet delegation with three (3) locations at sea where the USN ships could rendezvous with the Russian merchant ships in question for the inspection agreed upon. The names, call signs and hull numbers of all USN combatant ships were indicated in the State Department message. No course, speed, or route information had been provided by the Soviet delegation to facilitate the rendezvous, furthermore, the Soviet ships seemingly made no efforts to pass through the designated rendezvous points provided nor did they depart from the port on the dates specified. (CONFIDENTIAL)

(b) As a result, it was necessary to initiate an extensive special air and surface search to intercept the nine (9) Soviet ships. Aerial photography, visual observation and surface photograph were required in order to verify the presence and number of missiles in accordance with the agreement between the United States and the USSR. This air and surface search caused a great expenditure of time and effort which would not have been required had the Soviet lived up to the agreement for a rendezvous between the various ships. Eventually, however, all nine (9) of the Russian ships were located. When intercepted, they appeared well aware of the instructions of their government and cooperated in varying degrees from fairly good to poor. (CONFIDENTIAL)

| <u>SHIPS</u> | <u>Soviet Missile Report</u> | <u>CINCLANTFLT Missile Count</u> |
|-----------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| FIZIK KURCHATOV | 6 | 6 |
| ANASOV | 8 | 8 |
| DIVNOGORSK | 4 | 4 |
| LABINSK | 2 | 2 |
| ALAPAYEVSK | 2 | 0 |
| BRATSK | 2 | 2 |
| VOLGOLES | 6 | 7 |
| POLZUNOV | 6 | 5 |
| KOMSOMOL | 6 | 8 |
| TOTAL | 42 | 42 |

(3) PHASE III. From 11 November until 21 November when Task Force 136 was dissolved. During this period some ships were trailed and six additional ships were designated as being of special interest. However, no offensive weapons were detected on any of those ships intercepted or photographed during this phase.

CONFIDENTIAL

i. Concurrent with the lifting of the Cuban quarantine the President announced that Russia had indicated that all IL-28 (Beagle) aircraft would be removed within 30 days. Although not technically a part of the quarantine operation the mechanics for surveillance and verification of aircraft removal established during the period 1 December through 6 December were similar to those used earlier to verify missile removal. Removal of IL-28 aircraft was verified as follows:

| | |
|------------|-----------------|
| KRASNOGRAD | 15 IL-28 |
| KASIMOV | 15 IL-28 |
| OKHOTSK | <u>12 IL-28</u> |
| TOTAL | <u>42 IL-28</u> |

(CONFIDENTIAL.)

3. ATTACK CARRIER STRIKING FORCE (TF-135)

a. Forces which were ultimately to become Task Force 135 deployed on 11 October. This deployment was directed by CINCLANTFLT in order to position an Attack Carrier Striking Force near the Caribbean to reduce reaction time for Cuban operations. What started out as a routine deployment turned out to be an extended operation. As an example the USS INDEPENDENCE was underway for 43 consecutive days. During this time she steamed 15,517 miles and burned some five and a half million gallons of black oil. 2500 aircraft launches and recoveries were made during her 43 days underway. (SECRET)

b. On 19 October, USS ENTERPRISE was directed to get underway and proceed south. The destroyers departed their ports to rendezvous with ENTERPRISE. Task Force 135 was ultimately composed of the following forces:

- USS ENTERPRISE with CVG-6
- USS INDEPENDENCE with CVG-7
- Two Destroyer Squadrons
- 1 AO
- 1 AF
- 1 Marine Air Group (2 VMA and 1 VMF) shore based at Roosevelt Roads.

(SECRET)

c. Task Force 135 arrived in the best position for possible launch of air strikes 21 October. The force was to conduct air strikes and provide close air support in Eastern Cuba in support of the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay. In order to increase the capability of the force for close air support, a 20 plane Marine A4D Squadron was embarked in ENTERPRISE replacing the A3J heavy attack squadron normally based aboard. (SECRET)

d. On 22 October, CTF-135 reported that he was capable of striking all assigned targets and intended to conduct restrikes based on post strike briefings and reconnaissance. Four aircraft were kept airborne over Guantanamo during daylight and augmented as necessary. Night combat air patrol was to be provided as required. CTF-135 was maintained in a position so that the first aircraft could be on target within three hours after the order to execute. (SECRET)

e. On 22 October, Task Force 135 moved toward the restricted waters south of Cuba. This afforded better ASW protection for the force. (SECRET)

f. The need for repair and upkeep for a force remaining at sea was realized and a Destroyer Tender was positioned in San Juan, Puerto Rico for TF-135. DD tender availability was provided on a four at a time basis. This did not prove satisfactory due to the distance

SECRET

from the operating area and a tender was ultimately located at Kingston, Jamaica for TAV purpose. (CONFIDENTIAL)

g. Task Force 135 was ultimately dissolved and units were detached to return to the CONUS. One attack squadron, VA-75 was transferred from the INDEPENDENCE to GTMO as a relief for VA-35. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCE OPERATIONS

a. As early as 13 October the Fleet was alerted to the strong possibility of Soviet submarine activity in the Western Atlantic. At this time the MSTS tanker YERKON reported a surfaced submarine 130 miles north of Caracas, Venezuela. Its identity was not determined. The sudden appearance of the Soviet oiler TEREK in the Western Atlantic on 18 October became a matter of prime concern, since it was considered likely that submarines would use the TEREK for replenishment. Soviet trawlers were also in the Western Atlantic area and were kept under surveillance throughout the crisis. (SECRET)

b. During early October, ASW forces were employed in their normal operations. Long range air patrols from bases in Iceland, Argentia, Azores, Bermuda, Guantanamo Bay, and the CONUS were being conducted. The Ready HUK Group was conducting operations off the East Coast of the United States. As the Cuban situation began to deteriorate and with the setting of DEFCON 3 the tempo of ASW operations increased. (SECRET)

c. The large scale movement of amphibious forces to the Caribbean required VP aircraft coverage. Canadian Argus aircraft under CANCOMARLANT increased their ASW surveillance and their assistance and cooperation in ASW throughout the crisis contributed significantly to the ASW effort. Without this valuable assistance much of the Western Atlantic area would not have been adequately covered because of the heavy ASW commitments. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Argentia Sub-Air Barrier was established on 24 October to detect submarine activity as far forward as possible. 17 U.S. VP aircraft and ten U.S. submarines assisted by Canadian forces, participated in the barrier operation. Flight operations reached a tempo of 120 hours per day. Barrier was disestablished on 13 November (SECRET)

e. A total of 29 submarine contacts were investigated during the crisis. Six of the contacts were determined to be positive submarines. On 28 October, Task Group ALFA identified a submarine found on the surface as a Soviet FOXTROT Class. Photographs were obtained. On 31 October, ASW units forced a Soviet submarine to surface after maintaining 35 continuous hours of sonar contact. The submarine had the number 011 painted on one side of its sail and 911 painted on the other side. Another FOXTROT class submarine with the number 945 on its side was found on the surface on 3 November. (SECRET)

f. Throughout the period Fleet ASW forces were kept active and they operated at near wartime rates. The scope of the ASW effort can best be revealed by the following statistics:

| AIRCRAFT TYPE | SORTIES | FLIGHT HOURS | PERSONNEL |
|---------------|---------|--------------|-----------|
| VP | 1,404 | 11,302 | 3,907 |
| VS | 2,022 | 8,408 | 2,000 |
| HS | 918 | 2,136 | 952 |
| VAW | 371 | 1,564 | 280 |
| VW | 34 | 476 | 1,333 |
| TOTAL | 4,749 | 23,886 | 8,472 |

SECRET

In addition, 6,546 men on 4 CVSs directly supported the ASW effort. USAF aircraft also flew 87 sorties and 571 hours in support of ASW. (SECRET)

g. The Naval Air Reserve Units also participated on a voluntary basis. They logged more than 775 hours in logistic flights and some 350 hours of surveillance. These reserve forces supported more than 190 different surface and underwater craft. (SECRET)

h. The foregoing reports briefly tell the more significant activities of the ASW forces and cannot adequately describe the many hours of tedious search and tracking by ships and aircraft. The fact that at least one known Soviet submarine contact was prosecuted until forced to surface, is an indication of the determination with which the ASW effort was conducted. (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. AMPHIBIOUS FORCE OPERATIONS

a. On 15 October 1962, the Amphibious Force Atlantic was engaged in normal peacetime operations. One amphibious squadron (PHIBRON) with a Marine Battalion Landing Team (BLT) was in the Caribbean; another was enroute Norfolk following completion of a deployment with the SIXTH Fleet. A third was in the Mediterranean. An amphibious brigade landing exercise involving an amphibious group with three BLT embarked was scheduled during the period 22-25 October at Vieques Island, P.R. As a result, a significant amphibious force was already enroute to the Caribbean.

b. By 20 October, the readiness posture was oriented to combat preparedness and scheduled training exercises were canceled. (SECRET)

c. In consonance with the President's message, dependents were evacuated from the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay on 22 October. Arrangements were made to augment the resident ground defense force by three BLTs in the ensuing 48 hours. One BLT was air transported from Camp Pendleton. Another BLT was air transported from Camp Lejeune and the third was provided from the Caribbean Ready PHIBRON. (SECRET)

d. The JCS, on 25 October directed a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to embark on amphibious shipping and proceed from the Pacific Command to the Caribbean. This force was comprised of 21 ships and 11,000 marines. (SECRET)

e. By 8 November, the amphibious element comprised of 58 amphibious ships and over 40,000 marines were positioned and ready for combat. In back-up support were 28 MSTS ships. Additionally, four LST were assigned for administrative lift of U. S. Army armored units included in contingency planning. 11 LST were programmed for activation from the Reserve Fleet and acquisition of 4 commercially operated LST was accomplished to support remaining Army lift requirements. (SECRET)

f. During the period 8 November through 21 November at which time relaxation of readiness and incremental return of deployed units occurred, the amphibious element conducted training exercises, maintenance and recreational evolutions designed to maintain peak readiness. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. FLEET MARINE FORCE ATLANTIC OPERATIONS

a. Throughout the period of the Cuban crisis from 1 October to 15 December 1962, the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic performed its functions as a type command within the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Additionally, the headquarters functioned as Headquarters, II Marine Expeditionary Brigade from 23 October to 6 December. (UNCLASSIFIED)

SECRET

b. The scope of preparations and operations by the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic included:

(1) Preparation for the defense of GTMO for limited aerial attacks on specified military targets in Cuba, and for an amphibious assault by the II MEF in Joint Operations to seize Cuba.

(2) Evacuation of dependents from NAVBASE, GTMO.

(3) Reconnaissance flights over Cuban territory. (SECRET)

c. These preparations and operations were conducted in accordance with CINCLANTFLT OPORD 36-61 (Evacuation and Defense of the Naval Base, Guantanamo), CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 (Joint quick reaction air operations against Cuba and defense of Naval Base, Guantanamo), and CINCLANT OPLANS 314-62 and 316-62 (Joint airborne/amphibious operations to seize Cuba). (SECRET)

d. From 1 to 18 October, FMFLANT, at the direction of CINCLANTFLT, accelerated planning and preparations to increase their readiness posture. This could be identified as the increased readiness phase. During 19 to 30 October, was the deployment phase. Aviation units were deployed to NAS, Key West; NAS, Roosevelt Roads, and NAS Guantanamo in preparation for the execution of OPLAN 312. Ground units also were sent to Guantanamo to support the execution of the same plan. The 2nd Marine Division, together with aviation command elements and helicopters were embarking in preparation for the execution of contingency operations. Some FMFPAC units augmented FMFLANT units at Guantanamo while others were enroute from the Pacific to the Caribbean area. (SECRET)

e. By 31 October, embarkation had been completed and major units were at or enroute to the Caribbean area. The subsequent period until 28 November was primarily spent in refining existing plans and conducting exercises of deployed units to maintain proficiency of the troops and maintenance of equipment. This was the preparation for prolonged alert phase. To provide some conception of the magnitude of Fleet Marine Force participation in the Cuban crisis, there were over 40,000 personnel involved. Amphibious shipping numbered 86 ships including 28 MSTS ships. Of the 58 amphibious ships, 4 were LPH - the most LPH that had ever been made available for an amphibious operation. There were 387 Marine aircraft including attack, fighter, photographic, tanker, transport, helicopter and observation types. In addition there was a LAAM (HAWK) battalion, 123 Artillery pieces, 35 ONTOS and 78 tanks. (SECRET)

f. The stand-down phase from 29 November to 15 December consisted of relaxing readiness measures and the incremental return of all deployed units to home stations to resume normal readiness.

7. COMBINED LATIN AMERICAN/U. S. QUARANTINE FORCE

a. The Organization of American States (OAS) backed the President of the United States unanimously. Many Latin American Countries offered aid, either in the form of actual military units or free access to harbors and airfields. The OAS has indicated that nations providing forces to the quarantine force desired to operate as a combined force under the OAS, rather than U. S. Command, although they did not object to being placed under a U. S. Commander. Accordingly, CINCLANT designated COMSOLANT Commander Combined Latin American/U. S. Quarantine Task Force, CTF-137, and directed him to form TF-137

SECRET

with Latin American and U. S. Forces as assigned. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. The following units sortied from Trinidad for initial patrol stations on 12 October 1962.

ARA ROSALES
ARA ESPORA
ARU ZULIA
ARU NUEVA ESPARTA
USS MULLINIX

The ZULIA and NUEVA ESPARTA occupied patrol stations covering the passage between the Island of Grenada and the mainland of Venezuela. Further north the ROSALES patrolled the passage between the Island of Dominica and Guadalupe. The ESPORA patrolled two stations, one in the Guadalupe passage and the other off the Island of Monserrat. The heavily transversed Anegada Passage was kept under surveillance by the MULLINIX. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. The Dominican Republic Frigates GREGARIO LUPERNON and CAPITAIN PEDRO SANTANA arrived in San Juan, Puerto Rico on 15 October and underwent emergency repairs to get ready for patrol in the Mona Passage. The Guatemalan Frigate BURRUNIDA in overhaul at Miami, Florida was formally offered on 18 November. However, the quarantine ended prior to readying both the DOMREP and Guatemalan units for operations participation. Additionally, the Venezuelan submarine CARITE was available and on call in Venezuela, but was not used since submarine participation was not required. (CONFIDENTIAL)

H. AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING

1. Principal amphibious exercises conducted include:

a. PHIBULEX 2-62 conducted 13 June - 1 September 1962 in the Vieques and Onslow areas. One PHIBRON, one MEU and one MINDIV conducted training operations to include vertical envelopment exercises. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. PHIBTRALEX 3-62 commenced 30 August and scheduled to end about 12 November 1962 after participation in PHIBRIGLEX 62. One PHIBRON, one BLT and one MINDIV were assigned. This exercise and the subsequent PHIBRIGLEX were interrupted by the Cuban crisis on 18 October 1962. Upon the completion of Cuban operations the forces involved in PHIBTRALEX 3-62 and all other amphibious forces involved in Cuban Operations were returned to homeports. The Caribbean ready PHIBRON was maintained loaded and in readiness in Norfolk from 6 December to 7 January. (SECRET)

c. PHIBULEX 1-63 conducted 7 January - 1 March 1963 in the Vieques and Onslow areas. One PHIBRON, one MEU and one MINDIV conducted training operations. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. PHIBTRALEX 1-63 commenced on 25 February and is scheduled to conclude on 4 May. One PHIBRON, one BLT and one MINDIV are conducting training operations in the Vieques area. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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deeper than normal trough along the Atlantic Coast from July through the fall season with westerlies displaced south of normal over eastern North America and Western Atlantic. This displacement caused a continued exchange of warm tropical air to higher latitudes and cooler air from the polar regions to the tropics. With this more stable atmosphere in the lower latitudes there is less chance for tropical storm development.

d. Optimum Track Ship Routing. The OTSR Program is being utilized extensively by units of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet. This fiscal year will bring the number of routings to a new record total of 634 Atlantic crossings. This is an increase of 27 routings over the previous year. A summary of these crossings follows:

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|
| MSTS passenger routings | 148 |
| MSTS cargo routings | 171 |
| MSTS Tanker routings | 50 |
| MSTS Leased-Vessel routings | 82 |
| CRUDESLANT routings | 30 |
| SUBLANT routings | 17 |
| NAVAIRLANT routings | 15 |
| SERVLANT routings | 80 |
| PHIBLANT routings | 18 |
| MINLANT routings | 6 |
| MISCELLANEOUS (USCG, AGR, etc) | 5 |
| FOREIGN | <hr/> 12 |
| TOTAL | <hr/> 634 |

e. Numerical Weather Prediction Products. A series of self-briefing environmental charts generated by computer means, jointly at the U. S. Fleet Weather Central Suitland and the Fleet Numerical Weather Facility Monterey, have been included in the radio facsimile broadcast to ships in the Atlantic area. These charts are an analysis of, and a forecast for, sea and swell conditions in the North Atlantic Ocean. The computer products used in this program have been evaluated through this past year as superior to the previously hand derived products.

K. MISCELLANEOUS TRAINING

1. Fifteen foreign ships, representing eight countries, were trained during 1962. The underway training section of the Fleet Training Center, Norfolk, trained thirteen, while one each was trained by Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force and Commander Amphibious Training Group, Norfolk, Virginia. 2187 foreign officers and men representing 39 countries were given shore based training by the various Atlantic Fleet Type and Operational Commands. Missile shakedown training was conducted by the Italian light cruiser GARIBALDI under control of the Atlantic Fleet and became the first non-United States operational missile cruiser in NATO. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. In the field of special training, instruction in atomic warfare was provided for SACLANT officers and officers of other nations. The Nuclear Weapons Training Center, Atlantic traveling team presented the atomic warfare information course for approximately 82 of these officers at Norfolk, Virginia and Halifax, Nova Scotia. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Counterinsurgency Training. In response to the national effort to achieve an early increased readiness in the field of counterinsurgency operations the Atlantic Fleet in 1962:

SECRET

- a. Organized, equipped and commenced comprehensive training of SEAL TEAM TWO. This unit is composed of 10 officers and 50 enlisted men trained in UDT, SCUBA, and airborne procedures.
- b. Formed ten STAT (Seabee Technical Assistance Teams). Training will be continued in future years.
- c. Deployed a mobile training team to Viet Nam for Operational training.
- d. Provided technical assistance to Dominican Republic in preparation of their C1 Plan.
- e. Participated in the annual European Theater unconventional warfare exercise.
- f. Gave training ashore and afloat to over 2000 officers and men of 10 Latin American countries. (SECRET)

L. LOSS OF THRESHER

On 10 April 1963, the USS THRESHER (SSN-593), while conducting diving exercises, was lost taking the lives of 129 officers, men and civilians. The incident occurred in some 8,000 feet of water, approximately 220 miles off the Massachusetts coast. A Court of Inquiry has been convened. (UNCLASSIFIED)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

PART V

OPERATIONAL READINESS

A. GENERAL

1. Shortage of trained personnel continues to be the greatest single factor limiting the readiness of the Fleet to perform its assigned mission. This deficiency is further aggravated in some instances by the increased rate of introduction into the Fleet of new and complex equipment. On the other hand, this new equipment adds significant improvement in material readiness. Continuous effort at all levels of command is being exerted to improve the level of trained personnel and, further, to retain these personnel.

2. The barely satisfactory condition of Fleet anti-air warfare, deficiencies in mine countermeasures, material deficiencies in World War II vintage Fleet units, and the approaching block obsolescence of large numbers of CRUDESLANT, SERVLANT and PHIBLANT Fleet units continues to affect materially current Fleet readiness. Present numbers of underway replenishment ships are insufficient to support the SECOND and SIXTH Fleets simultaneously under war conditions without appreciable strategic warning. (CONFIDENTIAL)

B. INDIVIDUAL AND TEAM TRAINING

1. As in past years a major portion of training was conducted under Type and Operational Commanders. Shakedown and refresher training for the Fleet was conducted by Fleet Training Group, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and Fleet Training Centers Charleston, S. C., and Norfolk, Virginia. In February 1962, USS CLAUD JONES (DE-1033) set a record by achieving an ORI score of 86.77 which was the highest attained by any ship undergoing training at FTG GTMO in recent years. This record was shattered by USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65) later in the year when a grade of 90.36 was obtained. Thus appropriately opening a new dimension in naval warfare - the nuclear powered aircraft carrier. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. During 1962 there was a marked increase in SAM Training which included firing of TARTAR and homing TERRIER missiles to develop a surface-to-surface capability against small surface targets. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. The Nuclear Weapons Training Center, Atlantic at Norfolk, Virginia provided pre-commissioning as well as refresher training for nuclear weapons assembly teams assigned to the U. S. Atlantic Fleet. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. The Antisubmarine Warfare Tactical School at Norfolk, Virginia provided formal training for 2,348 officers and enlisted personnel. This total includes several Canadian and United Kingdom officers. (UNCLASSIFIED)

5. Fleet Antiair Warfare Training Center, Dam Neck, Virginia provided team training in missile and gunnery weapons systems, CIC and Anti-Air Warfare. Training of air controllers continued to be emphasized and resulted in qualification of controller supervisors.

6. FBM training at New London, Connecticut was greatly increased during the year in preparation for the expanding number of FBM submarines scheduled to join the Fleet.

CONFIDENTIAL

C. STRIKING FORCES

1. Assignment of Striking Forces. In order to obviate the undesirable state of readiness that results from lack of permanently assigned units to the SECOND Fleet, the following organizational concept is being utilized for Atlantic Fleet operations and deployment to the SIXTH Fleet. COMSECONDFLT will normally have operational control of attack carriers, cruisers, oilers, ammunition ships, and strike fleet destroyer squadrons when these ships are in the Atlantic. Type Commanders will retain operational control of their assigned ships during the periods of shipyard overhaul, refresher training, shakedown, and interim availabilities. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capability

a. There was a moderate increase in the number of nuclear weapons available for employment by the U. S. Atlantic Fleet. Widest dispersal of weapons consistent with approved LANTCOM dispersal limits was effected in order to achieve maximum utilization and availability. (SECRET)

b. Six of the nine deployed Polaris submarines (SSBN) were maintained on station continuously ready to launch on fifteen minutes notice. Armed with nuclear ballistic missiles, these submarines continue to provide the most ready element of the Fleet's nuclear weapon delivery capability and striking power. (SECRET)

c. Nuclear depth bombs for antisubmarine warfare were dispersed on all ASW aircraft carriers (CVS) and at most of the fourteen modified Advanced Underwater Weapon (MOD-AUW) shops located within the U. S. and overseas. Complete nuclear weapons are positioned at eight shops and non-nuclear components only are located at two additional shops. Two other MODAUW shops are fully operational, but political considerations prevent dispersal of nuclear weapons to these shops. Nuclear depth bombs will be dispersed to the remaining two shops following the completion of political arrangements and Nuclear Weapons Acceptance Inspections (NWI). (SECRET)

d. The ASROC rocket thrown depth charge with a nuclear warhead contributes to increased ASW readiness. A total of thirty seven destroyer types have the ASROC capability and twelve should gain this capability in the coming year. (SECRET)

3. Aircraft Squadron Operational Readiness. The number of carrier squadrons in the Atlantic Fleet during this reporting period is as follows: twelve VF, six VAH, thirteen VA jet and six VA prop. The number of operational squadrons has decreased since the last reporting period due to CVG-13 being decommissioned in October 1962.

a. VF-74, VF-41 and VF-102 have transitioned to the F-4, VMF-531 the first FMFLANT squadron to transition and is assigned duty with CONAD at Key West.

b. VAH-3 (Heavy Attack Training Squadron) has seventeen A-5 aircraft for training of FRAG Fleet Ready Air Group pilots.

c. VAH-7 completed transition to the A-5 and the squadron is aboard ENTERPRISE. VAH-1 is in the process of transitioning.

d. An A-3 detachment has been formed to cover the void when normally assigned VAH squadrons are transitioning to the A-5.

SECRET

e. Three VA squadrons have APN-41 radar altimeter installed in the A-4 B/C, enhancing the aircraft's all weather capability. APN-41 sets are scheduled for installation in all VA squadrons.

f. SIDEWINDER kits are being installed in all A-4 aircraft while undergoing Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR). A-4 detachments have been assigned to CVSs to provide an antisnooper capability.

g. VA-45 has been commissioned at Jacksonville as the A-1 Attack Training Squadron. VA-43 and 44 train only jet attack pilots.

h. Project NOMAN was a mock-up of missile sites found in Cuba. Targets were constructed for a high level VIP demonstration which did not materialize. The mock-ups are now being used for attack training by naval air and marine components.

i. ORIs have been divided into a shipboard phase and a shore based phase. By using split phases, more meaningful scoring is possible.

j. A4E are programmed for Fleet delivery in April. These aircraft have increased range and additional bomb racks over the A-4s.

k. Proposal has been made to reduce heavy attack squadrons to six (6) aircraft with Fleet introduction of the ASC. (SECRET)

4. Anti-Air Warfare. The low flyer threat is still a difficult problem but it can be overcome with the weapons systems available and proper training. Several new training exercises have been incorporated to provide this very necessary experience. Specific areas which require improvement are:

a. Continuous procurement of airborne and surface ECM and ECCM equipment to permit the generation of a realistic jamming environment. Atlantic Fleet ECM configured aircraft do not have the capability and are insufficient in number to generate jamming of the intensification needed for training.

b. Surface-to-air guided missiles have insufficient range. In addition, the numbers available are inadequate for a logistic back up.

c. Availability of the three-dimensional radar in the Fleet is not adequate.

d. At present ENTERPRISE, LONG BEACH and BAINBRIDGE have NTDS installed. As each NTDS equipped ship reaches the Fleet AAW readiness posture is significantly improved. (SECRET)

D. AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. Readiness of PHIBLANT units to use the ships and equipment available to conduct over-the-beach assault operations is considered GOOD. However, the Force readiness to conduct modern amphibious assault operations is considered marginally satisfactory for the following reasons:

1. Inadequate shipping, both to number and age to support lift requirements of the II MEF.

2. Lack of sufficient heavy caliber guns to meet gunfire support requirements.

SECRET

3. The slow speed of PHIBLANT ships.
4. Lack of modern amphibious types particularly LPH, LPD, and LSD.
5. Slow unloading features of APA/AKA types.

E. ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE.

1. GENERAL. The introduction of improved ASW sensors and weapon systems during the past year has resulted in a significant improvement in the overall ASW readiness of the Fleet. However, the following major problem areas remain and are of the utmost concern to the Commander in Chief:

- a. Continued slow decline in the inventory of ASW ships, submarines and aircraft.
- b. Apparent trend in thinking at some levels that improved equipments reduce total numbers of ships and aircraft required to maintain adequate ASW readiness.
- c. Continued shortage of ASW torpedoes.
- d. Lack of adequate submarine to submarine and submarine to air communications and IFF equipment.
- e. Continued shortage of supervisory personnel in ASW related rates.
- f. Continued shortage of adequate submarine service (related to a. above).

(**SECRET**)

2. SURFACE

a. Forces. Year by year, reduction in ASW ships is slowly but surely decreasing our ASW readiness. For years, the shipbuilding program has failed to meet our ASW ship needs. The program objective for 1973 calls for 135 escort type ships. Planned shipbuilding programs will provide only about 30% of our requirements for escort DE's by 1973. An acceleration of this program is essential if we are to maintain a balanced ASW capability. Construction of 12 to 19 new submarines and 20 new DE type ships each year is needed to reverse this degradation of our ASW forces.

b. Detection. The detection capability of surface ships has continued to improve due to the increased number of SQS-23 sonars in the Fleet. As of 1 July 1963, 60 Atlantic Fleet ships will have this long range sonar. Major problem areas are:

- (1) Severe reduction in detection range under adverse water conditions.
- (2) Need for more ships equipped with VDS (only 20 will have by 1 July 1963).
- (3) Continued slippage in the SQS-26 program. (**SECRET**)

c. Classification. Some improvement in classification capability has been realized by the installation of ASPECT "A" equipment in 22 ships and ASPECT "B" in 2 ships. Continued emphasis on getting these new equipments into the Fleet and in the area of further R&D is needed to realize significant improvement in this major problem area. (**SECRET**)

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d. Attack Capability. Increased installations of modern ASW torpedo tubes and ASROC has resulted in a significant increase in attack capability during the past year. 132 ships have the MK 32 AWTT for the MK 44 torpedo, 42 ships have the MK 23/24/25 AWTT for the MK 37 torpedo, and 42 ships have ASROC installed. 54 ships have DASH platforms installed but only 9 have the complete installations. The Operational Evaluations of the DASH has been delayed due to problems with the drone. Surface ships still do not have a capability to use the MK 37-1 wire guided torpedo. Major problems include:

(1) Continued shortage of ASW torpedoes and ASROC missiles. Fleet still does not have one shipfull of these items.

(2) Slippage in the DASH program.

(3) Urgent need for the Fleet Operational Readiness Accuracy Check Sites (FORACS). (SECRET)

e. Personnel. Significant shortages in the higher supervisory ratings continues. This situation is becoming critical due to the introduction of more sophisticated equipment into the Fleet. During the past year onboard percentages have declined in the SO and ET rates with little improvement in the other rates.

Chief Petty Officers and First Class Petty Officers in CRUDESLANT

| | <u>FEB 62</u> | <u>FEB 63</u> |
|-----------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Sonarmen | 36% | 28% |
| Electronic Technician | 28% | 24% |

(CONFIDENTIAL)

3. AIR

a. Forces. The receipt of additional numbers of SH-3A, S-2D, and P-3A aircraft has improved the overall readiness of the ASW Air Forces. The slowly declining inventory of ASW aircraft and the slow rate of providing replacements for the older P-2E, P-2H, and P-5B are matters of concern. To date the P-3A has proven to be an excellent patrol aircraft. At the current funding rate, however, it will take almost ten years to replace our present patrol plane force. Both the P-2E and the P-2H are cramped and have no room for improved electronic equipments. Ten years is obviously an undesirably long time to be forced to operate the aged P-2 series. The lack of a replacement seaplane and the declining inventory of P-5Bs adds to the problem. (SECRET)

b. Detection. Capability has continued to improve with the receipt of more JEZEBEL equipped aircraft and helicopters with longer range sonar. Considerable improvement in the tactical use of JEZEBEL was realized during the past year. Operational exercises with this equipment has shown the significant part that LOFAR/CODAR can play in ASW. Unfortunately, since our present JEZEBEL buoys operate for only two or three hours, they must be replaced several times in a pattern before a submarine has to expose itself to detection. A longer life JEZEBEL BUOY (8 to 24 hours) would provide an economical way to further the tactical development and operational use of JEZEBEL. Improved detection of snorkels and periscopes remains a problem. A better light weight aircraft radar is urgently needed. (SECRET)

SECRET

SECRET

c. Air ASW Ordnance. Overall shortage of modern air drop ASW torpedoes continues to seriously affect air ASW readiness. Stocks of sonobuoys have improved during the past year with adequate numbers now available to resume full training and slowly build up a war reserve.

d. Task Group DELTA. This special ASW Task Group, consisting of one and one-half VP squadrons, SOSUS stations as assigned, and submarines as assigned for services, was established on 1 September 1961 for a trial period of one year. The excellent success that this group has had in raising the overall level of VP ASW operations and in the improvement of tactics, resulted in establishing Task Group DELTA on a permanent basis. Its primary job is to accelerate the development of ASW tactics, doctrine and operating procedures for VP aircraft with a secondary job of serving as an example and nucleus for training all LANTFLT maritime patrol air units. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. Personnel. Significant shortages in the higher supervisory ratings continues. Current manning level, in terms of available skilled talent in the Group IX ratings, creates a limitation on the ability to conduct sustained operations. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. SUBMARINES

a. Forces. 62 submarines are currently available for deployment on ASW missions. 63% of these are overage (17 years). The 1973 inventory objective is 105 submarines. Current building rate falls far short of meeting this objective. Inadequate numbers of submarines also adversely affects ASW readiness in other areas that require submarine services (SECRET)

b. Detection. There has been little improvement in the detection capability in submarines during the past year although some gains were made as a result of SSN quieting programs. The long range BQQ-2 system is still in technical evaluation and has experienced considerable slippage from planned milestones. (SECRET)

c. Attack Capability. The ASW attack capability of submarines has improved somewhat during the past year due to the introduction of the MK 37-1 wire guided torpedo and an increased overall inventory of MK 37 torpedoes. However, the MK 37 torpedo remains in short supply with only about 60% of initial shipfills currently available. The older Mk 27-4 torpedo is being used to partially defray the shortage but overage batteries seriously reduce their reliability. Additional problems are:

(1) Current stocks of effective anti-surface ship torpedoes are inadequate.

(2) No ASW submarine torpedo available with conventional warhead that has a significant capability to kill a deep diving, high performance submarine.

(3) Mines MK 10-3 and MK 27 are inadequate and should be replaced by the MK 57 and a new mobile mine.

(4) Evasion devices, particularly NAE beacons are in short supply.

d. Personnel. Severe strain is being placed on diesel submarines due to the necessity of furnishing experienced enlisted personnel to meet the needs of new construction. The lack of supervisory personnel in the SO, TM, FT, MT, ET ratings and the numerical shortages in other ratings plus a high turnover rate are adversely affecting operational readiness. A related problem is the inadequate input to basic submarine school classes. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SECRET

5. COORDINATED ASW. During the past year, emphasis was continued on the improvement of ASW barrier tactics. Based upon the results of recent operations, a new ASW Barrier Doctrine (BARDOC) has been developed. This doctrine has been submitted to both National and NATO authorities for promulgation in suitable tactical doctrine publications. With the establishment of TG DELTA on a permanent basis, continued emphasis is being placed on the improvement of coordinated VP/SOSUS operations. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. ASW COMMUNICATIONS. Continuing replacement of old equipment with new and improved transmitters and receivers has enhanced the communications capability in the ASW forces.

a. In the past year the following progress has been made in ASW communications in the Atlantic Fleet.

(1) All maritime patrol aircraft have been equipped with an SSB transceiver.

(2) All destroyer types have received improved SSB equipment.

(3) Six NAVFACS have received improved SSB equipment.

(4) The AMANET has been established.

(5) HEIFER (SOSUS/JEZEBEL Data Readout Link) equipment has been installed in Brunswick, Norfolk, Jacksonville, at six SOSUS stations and in two VP squadrons.

(6) All ASW carriers now have at least two sets of equipment for establishing a covered ship shore circuit.

(7) Covered teletype circuits have been installed between the following stations:

CANCOMCARLANT and COMFAIRQUONSET

NAVSTA Bermuda and Kindley AFB

NAVFAC Ramey AFB and COMCARIBSEAFRON

NAVSTA Roosevelt Roads and COMCARIBSEAFRON

COMASWFORLANT and COMFAIRWINGSLANT

COMCARIBSEAFRON and Balboa

COMEASTSEAFRON was added to ASW Group Commanders net.

COMOCEANSYSLANT DPU and STIC

Norfolk and Lajes (previously uncovered)

(8) COMFAIRQUONSET, COMFAIRJAX and NAVBASE Bermuda now have the capability of terminating a covered ships shore RATT circuit with any Atlantic CVS.

(9) A new CANUS ASW hotline links Halifax, Argentia, Brunswick and Norfolk.

(SECRET)

F. COORDINATION WITH AIR DEFENSE COMMAND.

1. The Fleet Operations Control Center (OPCONCENTER) Barrier has processed a total of 5,431 Coast Guard ocean station vessel (OSV) bogey reports from 1 July 1962 to 15 March 1963; 4,761 were correlated by flight plans or telephone. The remaining OSV bogey reports

SECRET

were introduced into the NORAD Surveillance and Tactical Network.

2. The OPCONCENTER Barrier facilities have been utilized for participation in NORAD Exercises: Shock Wave VI, VIII; Desktop V; Sky Shield III.

3. CINCLANTFLT forces expended 1,862 ship hours and 1,349 aircraft hours during the reporting period providing search and rescue services in coordination with the U. S. Coast Guard and U. S. Air Force. (All statistics computed from Barrier Files)

4. a. The Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) Barrier aircraft flew a total of 9,604.6 hours on station from 1 July 1962 to 15 March 1963. An additional 7,889.6 hours were flown in training and support of the Airborne Early Warning Mission.

b. A total of 206 unknown air contacts reported by COMBARFORLANT to the Fleet Operations Control Center Barrier were introduced into the NORAD Surveillance and Tactical Teletype Network; eight of these were forwarded by flash message to appropriate major combatants. These unknowns were followed by amplifying information received as the contacts were developed by COMBARFORLANT.

c. The G-I-UK Barrier has maintained an effectiveness of 72.25% based on detection of known flight tracks penetrating the surveillance area for period 1 July 1962 to 1 March 1963. Barrier effectiveness averaged 94.75% while aircraft were on station using Barrier aircraft actual position reports. (SECRET)

G. COORDINATION WITH OTHER MAJOR COMMANDS

1. Standing Operating Procedures for the Coordination of Atomic Operations. On 6-7 September 1962 and 16, 17, and 18 January 1963, CINCLANTFLT Staff personnel with personnel from JCS, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, USCINCEUR participated in conferences to consider and develop a TRI-NOME system of designating nuclear strike in SIOP and NON-SIOP nuclear operations. (SECRET)

2. JCS Joint/Combined Exercise Scheduling Conference - CINCLANTFLT Staff personnel assisted CINCLANT in planning and representation at this conference. It was convened at the JCS on 22-25 January 1963. Conferees from all unified and specified commands plus the service departments met to coordinate their Joint exercise requirements. The objective was to effect economies in demands for forces and requirements in general. The JCS will produce a conference report reflecting the results of the conference.

H. FUNCTIONAL READINESS

I. GUIDED MISSILES

a. Surface to Air Missiles

(1) There are currently six guided missile cruisers, eight guided missile destroyers and nine guided missile frigates in the Atlantic Fleet. Of these, three cruisers are equipped with the 100 mile range TALOS missiles with nuclear capability, three cruisers are equipped with ten mile range TERRIER, one TALOS cruiser is equipped with twenty mile range TARTAR. All guided missile destroyers are equipped with twelve mile range TARTAR. All guided missile frigates are equipped with twenty mile range TERRIER. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Surface-to-Air Missile Systems were unreliable during the reporting period. The most troublesome components of the systems were the fire control radars, the three coordinate search radars and the test equipment. Less troublesome were the missiles and computers. Finally, the launchers and weapons direction equipments were relatively trouble free. Overall system documentation was satisfactory; however, there remain certain weak areas that require improvement. (CONFIDENTIAL)

(3) Logistic support was still unsatisfactory from an operating standpoint. The majority of the down time on inoperative equipments was due to delays in receipt of required spares to repair these equipments. Shortages existed in the numbers of all types of surface to air missiles necessary for ship loadout and war reserve. This situation will continue for the next two years due to the rapid increase in guided missile ship deliveries.

(4) The missile fire control area suffered from a lack of enough trained personnel to maintain what has proved to be an extremely complex and demanding system. The overall experience level is dropping steadily as the rate of personnel turnover increases.

2. TARTAR

a. The overall reliability of the Weapons System was unsatisfactory because of the unreliability of the SPS-39 and SPG-51 radars. The SPS-39 must be degraded because of its inability to provide consistently accurate altitude information to the WDE. The system has been further hampered by the limitations of the SPS-39 in the proximity of land and when there was any degree of cloud cover. The reliability of the SPG-51 has been totally unsatisfactory, primarily due to high failure rate of components and the unreliability of replacement parts. In general, ships personnel were able to trouble shoot and locate casualties quickly, only to find that required parts were not on board or in stock. This was particularly true for the SPG-51 radar. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Weapons direction equipment had a high degree of reliability requiring only routine daily maintenance checks and adjustments.

c. The computers have been very reliable during this period with only minor casualties.

d. During this period the overall operation of the missile launcher has been satisfactory except for numerous small casualties.

e. The AN/DSM-55 Missile Test Sets operated in an unreliable manner. It was normally impossible to obtain significant information about a missile from a single automatic MST. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. TERRIER

a. The TERRIER systems in the Atlantic Fleet were tactically useful except against low flying targets. The missile launching and magazine systems operated with a high degree of reliability and few minor casualties. In general the older the ship the more successfully the crew was able to operate the system and to conduct successful firings. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. An exception to this was the CANBERRA with the only AN/SPQ-5 fire control radars which were a continual maintenance and reliability problem. Through constant operation and maintenance, it was possible to maintain the system in a nearly satisfactory state of readiness. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

c. The AN/SPQ-5A ships were in better condition. However, they appeared to suffer in varying degree with radar collimation stability, and they all required a large number of man hours per day for test and maintenance. Their system documentation is generally adequate. They suffered from lack of spare parts which was a major contributing factor to down time. The SPQ-5A radars continued to demonstrate the fact that ship's force was frequently unable to maintain them in a war-ready status. Under combat conditions, it was estimated that 24 hour maintenance would be required. Quality control was a serious problem. Spare parts for some field changes and ORDALTS were extremely slow in being available to the Fleet. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. The AN/SPG-55 and 55A ships were generally less operable but were further back on the debugging and learning curve. Radar collimation stability appeared near a successful solution according to tests conducted in the DAHLGREN. Tests in DAHLGREN also indicated the range limitation due to radar elevation jitter was near solution. System test and maintenance requirements were extensive and spare parts shortages were severe. The AN/SPG-55 radars were hardest hit by personnel transfers and the extended supply lines. System documentation lagged. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. TALOS

a. During the first quarter calendar year 1963, three TALOS cruisers became active in the U. S. Atlantic Fleet. All have capability for the most advance TALOS missile, the 6C1. A meaningful statement of the status of the LANTFLT TALOS ships cannot be made in view of limited operating experience. However, documentation and spare parts problems with the new and converted radar were a problem as with other new TERRIER and TARTAR missile systems. (CONFIDENTIAL)

5. TRAINING

a. The pre-shipboard assignment training program improved as components were provided to training facilities. The state of training of individuals was at the point where they were useful only after they had about six months experience on the equipment in the Fleet. Systems training was inadequate. Both launcher technician and Missile Technician training was adequate. There was an insufficient supply of properly trained Fire Control Technicians (Missile). Officer training was inadequate. While most new construction ships' officers received some training, replacement officers most often did not. Training materials and techniques in use were inefficient. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. A program to provide much needed, practical, system-oriented, maintenance training for missile system technicians was instituted with the designation of the TERRIER and TARTAR Training Ships. The LANTFLT Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Training Ship program commenced on 9 October. The USS ADAMS (DDG-2) served in this capacity for three weeks. Ten students were on board for TARTAR Weapons Control System (IWCS) maintenance training. Two of the students had just completed the TARTAR MK 74 WCS course at GM School, Dam Neck. The other eight students were selected by COMCRUDESLANT from the Weapons Departments of LANTFLT DDG's. All students were top grade (2/C and above) Fire Controlmen. The instructors were the USS ADAMS' senior fire controlmen and two engineers on contract from the VITRO Corporation. The training program was coordinated by a representative of the LANTFLT Missile Weapons System Training Unit from Fleet Training Center, Dam Neck. The Commanding Officer of the ship (under the OPCON of COMCRUDESLANT) had responsibility for the success of this program. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

6. AIR LAUNCHED MISSILES

a. Generally, all Atlantic Fleet fighter and light attack aircraft are missile-equipped. Fighter squadrons are equipped with radar guided SPARROW or infra-red homing SIDEWINDER air-to-air missiles. Attack squadrons are equipped with radio guided BULLPUP air-to-surface missiles.

b. Both SIDEWINDER and BULLPUP have proved to be relatively reliable in fleet firings. F3H/SPARROW missile reliability has been low but progress is being made by BUWEPS toward improving it. Shortages of all types of air launched missiles exist due primarily to lack of funds. CNO is aware of this problem. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. SIDEWINDER. All LANTFLT F-8 airplanes are SIDEWINDER 1A equipped. This missile continues to demonstrate better than 60% system reliability. The major deficiency continues to be the number of missiles available. A recent study of LANTFLT missile stocks showed that about 35 days war usage is available. Because of this, carrier loads were reduced from 600 missiles down to 400 missiles. Training with SIDEWINDER 1A has been restricted to one per pilot per year vice three per pilot per year as allowed by CNO. Development difficulties have delayed introduction of SIDEWINDER 1C into the Fleet. Until this missile is operational, the F8U-2N will not have an all-weather kill capability and total numbers of SIDEWINDER will be inadequate. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. SPARROW III. Low reliability and inadequate numbers are the major deficiencies with this missile. In spite of the SPARMAC - a program designed to increase F3H weapon system reliability - only 35% of the firings from this aircraft were successful. The figures for the F4H show little improvement. A high misfire rate caused by poor training and maintenance is a contributing factor. This will be handled on the Fleet level. However, the misfire rate notwithstanding, SPARROW III reliability is much too low. Slightly over 30 days war usage of SPARROW III are on hand in LANTFLT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. BULLPUP. Limited numbers of missiles and inadequate training are the major deficiencies with this missile. Less than 40 days war usage of BULLPUP is available in LANTFLT. Firing training has been restricted to three per pilot per year. Until a suitable training missile is available and an adequate number of missiles can be fired by each pilot each year (5), readiness with this missile will not be high. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. PROJECT MERCURY

a. Atlantic Fleet Project Mercury recovery support during the period 1 July 1962 - 30 April 1963 was considerable, although only one major flight, MA-8, was conducted during this period. A second flight, MA-9, a 22 orbit 34 hour mission was originally scheduled for 2 April, but this date has now slipped to 7 May, with a possibility of further slippage.

b. A resume of recovery operations for MA-8 is as follows:

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>TITLE</u> | <u>OBJECTIVE</u> | <u>RESULTS</u> |
|-------------|--------------|--|---|
| 3 OCT 62 | MA-8 | Six orbit manned flight (CDR W. M. SCHIRRA, USN) | Test objective met. Spacecraft landed on completion of 5 3/4 orbits in planned landing area in the Pacific near Midway Island, and was recovered by USS KEARSARGE (CVS-33). |

CONFIDENTIAL

c. During the flight, Atlantic Fleet units were stationed along the orbital ground track for orbit #1 from Cape Canaveral to the Canary Islands and in the planned landing areas at termination of orbits 1, 2, and 3. Ships and aircraft utilized in Project Mercury during the period 1 July 1962 - 30 April 1963 were:

| <u>SHIP/AIRCRAFT</u> | <u>NO. DAYS/HOURS</u> |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| AO | 26 days |
| ARS | 11 days |
| DD | 137 days |
| MSO | 4 days |
| CVS | 6 days |
| A-1E | 3.4 hours |
| UH-34 | 34.5 hours |
| CH-37 | 90.5 hours |
| SH-3A | 30.1 hours |
| P-2 | 457.9 hours |
| C-131 | 24.0 hours |
| S-2 | 3.4 hours |
| C-1 | 68.2 hours |
| EC-121 | 205.7 hours |
| P-5 | 34.8 hours |
| WC-121 | 17.0 hours |

These totals do not include the period 1 January - 30 April 1963, for which data are not available at this time.

d. In addition to the recovery support for the flight, Commander Task Force 140 (Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla FOUR) worked in close coordination with NASA Manned Spacecraft Center in the development of improved recovery techniques. Information concerning recovery techniques was distributed to all commands concerned with Project Mercury.

e. In December 1961, NASA requested that the Department of Defense support Project Mercury through fiscal year 1964. MA-9, originally a 3 plus orbit mission, is now planned as a one-day mission with 22 orbits as the goal. MA-10 also is planned as a one-day mission for first quarter FY 1964. MA-11 is planned as a backup for MA-9 and MA-10. Present indications are that the MA-10 and MA-11 missions will depend on the degree of success of MA-9. (CONFIDENTIAL)

f. In January 1963 the DOD Representative for Project Mercury Support Operations promulgated a Revised overall Plan for DOD support of Project Mercury Operations which differed in only one respect from the previous Interim Overall Plan. By this change the DOD Representative assumed from CINCLANT the responsibility for coordination of Contingency Recovery planning. Concurrent with the issuance of this Plan the DOD Representative has assumed an increasingly significant role in coordination of all the details of recovery support. However, instead of relieving CINCLANTFLT and CTF 140 in the amount of work devoted to support of NASA, this change has had the effect of a considerable increase in administrative workload of CINCLANTFLT and CTF 140 and no decrease in the level of operational support. This increase in administrative workload is attributable to the creation of a new echelon, the DOD Representative, between NASA and commands supporting NASA and the high degree of centralized control and coordination exercised by the DOD Representative.

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g. In January 1963 the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum assigning responsibilities for DOD support of Project GEMINI which gave the DOD Representative essentially the same Terms of Reference as for Project Mercury. CINCLANT objected to the loss of operational control of his forces for the extended periods involved in the Project GEMINI flights (up to two weeks). In March the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference to CINCLANT's objection, stated that the support of Project GEMINI by military forces was being examined. Nothing further has been heard on this subject. (CONFIDENTIAL)

8. NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING ORGANIZATIONS

a. The limited Naval Control of Shipping exercise runs continuously to provide a training program for the currently assigned Naval Control of Shipping Officers (NCSO). Formal training for augmentation personnel is provided by the Naval Control of Shipping Organization (NCSORG) Office, Naval Base, Norfolk. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Formal training courses are available for Convoy Commodores and their staffs. The last class, which consisted of twenty officers, was conducted in July 1962, and another is planned for July 1963. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. The NATO-wide Command Post Exercise (CPX), FALLEX 62, included Naval Control of Shipping play with both Naval and Civil components of the NCSORG participating fully. Specific and detailed recommendations, some of which are of considerable importance, are contained in the post-exercise analysis report and will require consideration by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. (SECRET)

d. As a result of the CNO's conference held at Vina Del Mar in April 1962, it was decided by the CNO's that an NCSORG be set up, using IADB C-526 as a guide. A working conference convened at COMFIFTEEN Headquarters in July to establish an NCSO on service levels. The conference was attended by representatives of the U. S. and all South American Navies with the exception of BOLIVIA. A plan for training was established with COMFIFTEEN as temporary overall coordinator of the training program. The plan covers the establishment and training of a basic organization in each Navy. Then, as experience is gained, CPX's will be conducted. COMCARIBSEAFRON and COMSOLANT are responsible for assisting the Caribbean and Atlantic Countries of South America in establishing and exercising their NCSORGs. (CONFIDENTIAL)

9. MINE AND MINE COUNTERMEASURES. The overall readiness of the Mine Force to carry out its assigned war mission is evaluated as UNSATISFACTORY. The reasons given for this evaluation are as follows:

- a. Lack of suitable mine countermeasures devices capable of sweeping pressure and pressure-combination mines.
- b. Insufficient minesweepers to meet the combined initial mobilization requirements of both COMEASTSEAFRON and COMPHIBLANT.
- c. Lack of sufficient numbers of command logistic ships.
- d. Lack of sufficient numbers of mine countermeasures support ships MCS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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CONFIDENTIAL

10. HARBOR DEFENSE. The Harbor Defense Unit, Norfolk, Virginia, is the only active fleet organization concerned with Harbor Defense on the east coast of the U. S. A change in the concept of operations of harbor defense has been implemented. This new concept shifts the emphasis from the fixed defenses of World War II to a highly mobile Harbor Defense Team capable of being utilized for contingency situations and defense of the CONUS. (CONFIDENTIAL)

11. GUNNERY. The state of gunnery readiness has been adversely affected by the following:

- a. Non-availability of firing areas and targets.
- b. Heavy operational commitments.
- c. Shortages of conventional ammunition.

Shore bombardment target designation, target acquisition and surface firing remain SATISFACTORY to COOD. (CONFIDENTIAL)

12. CONVENTIONAL ORDNANCE. The supply of many ordnance items continues to be far short of requirements. The more prominent deficiencies are:

a. Aircraft Ammunition - serious shortages exist in the MK 43/44 torpedoes, MK 6 smoke light, ZUNI, NAPALM, BULLPUP, SIDEWINDER, SPARROW, and low drag bombs. Planned production and delivery rates of most of these items through fiscal year 1964 will not meet the estimated Atlantic Fleet requirements. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Ship Ammunition - serious shortages exist in the improved SAM as well as in MK 37/44 torpedoes. The delivery rate is not sufficient to provide even basic fills and is becoming more critical as additional ships are being commissioned and are completing FRAMs I and II. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. Surface and Air Launched Missiles - there now exists a shortage in every surface and air launched missile. The production of TARTAR, newer versions of TERRIER and BULLPUP cannot meet the basic ship fill requirement. Additional production is required to fill ship magazines, AE combat reserves, CLOUD requirements, MAP, and adequate depot and pipeline stocks. It is difficult to train personnel adequately and yet maintain sufficient combat stocks of missiles based on current production schedules. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. Mines - there is a lack of adequate stockpile of reliable offensive mines effective against submarines. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. ASW - As reported last year the ASW weapons situation remains unsatisfactory and is the most critical single deficiency in ASW readiness. The worst situation exists in the area of ASW torpedoes. Torpedoes are common to all ASW vehicles and are our primary ASW weapons. It is estimated that current stocks of ASW weapons would be completely exhausted in less than two months of an all-out ASW war. Stocks of the more modern weapons would probably be exhausted in less than 2 weeks. (CONFIDENTIAL)

13. ENGINEERING. With the advent of the introduction of more new construction and FRAM completions into the fleet the decrease in engineering casualties reported from these types has been encouraging. The Chief of Naval Operations policy of giving complete

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overhauls has contributed to a leveling-off period in the older ships. The increasing age of ships, especially in CRUDESLANT and PHIBLANT, will continue to contribute toward engineering casualties until such time as they are either FRAMMED or replaced by new construction. (CONFIDENTIAL)

14. DAMAGE CONTROL AND ABC DEFENSE. There has been no significant changes in damage control and ABC defense readiness during the period of this report. Type Commanders have stressed damage control, ABC defense and proper maintenance of equipment on board. The watertight integrity of a great number of ships, particularly those of WW II vintage, continues to be a major problem. While interim washdown systems have been installed in almost all major ships, permanent installation with remote controls are needed. The de-contamination stations and procedures on large ships have been fairly effective, but on ships of DD and smaller size, they can be evaluated only as satisfactory. The continued shortage of radiac equipment limits training and readiness in ABC warfare. The operational readiness of the Fleet is evaluated as SATISFACTORY in damage control and ABC defense. (CONFIDENTIAL)

15. COMMUNICATIONS. The communication capability of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet has shown continued improvement during fiscal year 1963. Many on-line cryptographic and radio equipment programs have either been completed or are nearing completion. The following items of particular interest have occurred during the period of this report: (CONFIDENTIAL)

a. All Atlantic Fleet ships with a radio teletype broadcast reception capability have been equipped with cryptographic equipment for on-line reception, and 100 word per minute operation. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. The installation of single sideband equipment in Atlantic Fleet ships is continuing. Delivery of equipment to the Fleet is still lagging requirements. The present deficiency is 43 equipments below requirements. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. Three Air Transportable Communications Units (ATCU) under operational control of CINCLANTFLT are positioned one each at Naval Communications Station Norfolk (ATCU 100A) Naval Communications Station San Juan (ATCU 100), and Naval Station Key West (ATCU 100). CNO has placed a fourth unit (ATCU 100A) under temporary operational control of CINCLANTFLT. This latter ATCU is located at Glync, Georgia. Manning for these units continues to be a problem, however, emergency augmentation plans for manning of these units have been prepared. (CONFIDENTIAL)

d. The VLF component of the OSCAR SIERRA broadcast emanating from Cutler, Maine has continued to provide highly reliable communication to deployed FMB submarines. Plans to convert this CW broadcast to on-line RATT have been finalized. However, these plans are being held in abeyance pending successful completion of contractor modifications to the transmitter. (SECRET)

16. SEAMANSHIP. There has been no significant improvement in seamanship over the previous report. The number of groundings and collisions continue to be in approximately the same proportion as for the same period in the previous report. Some of these were limited to minor operational collisions, i. e., conning errors due to poor judgment during mooring, berthing and replenishment operations. (CONFIDENTIAL)

17. REPLENISHMENT AT SEA. The need for improving the cargo handling and transfer rates for LANTFLT replenishment ships continues to be a problem. Utilization of helicopters

for transfer of missiles and small amounts of equipment has cut transfer time required and removed the necessity of spending vulnerable periods alongside. Transfer of ammunition continues to be stressed by Type Commanders to assure capability in this field.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

18. ELECTRONICS.

a. New long range air search and height finding radars are being introduced into the fleet in significant numbers. After some early adjustments, these radars are producing greatly increased performance with only minor difficulties.

(1) Air Search (Early Warning) Radars. The AN/SPS-29/37/37A radars are designed to detect a one square meter target at ranges varying between 230 to 450 miles depending upon antenna installation. These radars incorporate ECCM fixes (pulse compression rapid frequency changing capabilities and MTI) and operate in the 215-225 MCS band. The AN/SPS-40 radar is a light weight, long range radar designed for small ships (DD, DDR, DDC). It is designed to detect a one square meter target at ranges out to 205 miles and operate in the 405-450 MCS band which enhances frequency density for air search radars. The ECCM features employed in this radar (pulse compression and early limiting) are intended to provide adequate invulnerability to electronics jamming. Pulse compression permits operation at levels of coverage power comparable to "High Power" equipments without transmitting pulse peaks in the mega-watt range. In addition, pulse compression improves range resolution without sacrifice of detection capability. The AN/SPS-32 on LONG BEACH and ENTERPRISE are the first two coordinate air search radar with a fixed array antenna employing electronic scanning in the azimuth plane and incorporating ECCM fixes. This radar features high performance capability in detection ranges of 450 NM with a data rate of one second.
(SECRET)

(2) The AN/SPS-8 remains the predominate height finding radar in the Fleet today. This radar has an average height determining range of 80 miles. The AN/SPS-42 has been introduced into the Fleet. However, the performance of the AN/SPS-42 has been disappointing with average height determining ranges of about 90 NM. The AN/SPS-42 is a three coordinate medium range radar providing range, bearing and height information on air targets at a four second data rate. The AN/SPS-33 fixed array automatic tracking radar is installed in LONG BEACH and ENTERPRISE. The AN/SPS-33 is a three dimensional fixed array S-band radar capable of inertialess beam positioning in azimuth and elevation and automatic tracking in space stabilized coordinates of many high speed targets. Designed target acquisition range is 215 NM on 0.25 square meter target. (SECRET)

b. Surface Search Radars. In general there is no ECCM capability in surface search radar systems. The otherwise excellent surface search radars are extremely vulnerable to both jamming and deception and are the main source of "C" band interference for present day missile control and telemetry response data. (SECRET)

c. Fire Control/Guided Missile Control Radars. In the case of gun laying systems the problem is availability of ECCM equipment. Frequency slewing appears to be the best device now available and provides a good anti-jamming capability. A pulse coding system would further protect these systems. In the missile-control field, frequency slewing is not presently feasible since beam riding missiles must either be increasingly complicated to follow the slewing frequency; or broad-banded in frequency response, and therefore more susceptible to jamming by an enemy or our own DECM. In general, missile control radars are not vulnerable to off-target jamming because of their narrow (pencil) beam characteristics. The "Home-on jam" counter for enemy jamming seems ideally suited to missile application.
(SECRET)

SECRET

d. Guided Missile Acquisition Radars. These systems, in increasing numbers as more guided missile ships reach the Fleet, generally suffer from the same problems as the early warning height finding radars. Any deficiency which exists in the acquisition for the missile control equipment limits the efficiency of the missile system. Short range TARTAR and TERRIER systems are not seriously effected, but the longer range TALOS missiles are limited by their ability to acquire and track the target. (SECRET)

e. Airborne (Early Warning) Radars. The AN/APS-82 radar in the E-1A is providing the Fleet with a highly reliable low flyer detection capability. In addition this radar is being effectively used for CAP and strike control. Further, this radar is now being used aboard ASW carriers (CVS) for controlling aircraft search patterns. Introduction of the E-2A should enhance the early warning capability. The E-2A will be equipped with the AN/APS-96 radar which will provide a high confidence detection probability at ranges out to 200 miles. The radar has been designed specifically for the Airborne Tactical Data System (NTDS). (SECRET)

f. AI Radars. The introduction of the F4B with the APQ-72 radar has given the fleet a real all weather interceptor capability. The APQ-72 has proven vulnerable to both mechanical and electronic jamming while operating in the "automatic" mode but not in the "manual track" mode. (SECRET)

g. Single Side Band Equipment. New installations of single sideband radio equipment are being accomplished fast as deliveries are made. This is producing a significant improvement in communications capabilities in the Fleet. (CONFIDENTIAL)

h. Teletype Equipment. The Atlantic Fleet has shifted from 60 to 100 word per minute teletype operation. At first, this produced an avalanche of maintenance problems due to the necessity for closer tolerance adjustments and stringent lubrication and cleanliness routines. With the increased emphasis on teletype maintenance and the introduction of replacement high speed machines, these problems are reducing to manageable proportions.

i. Sonar Equipment. The problems of sonar "spoking", due to noisy sonar domes, and frequent high voltage motor generator failure in the RDT series sonars (AN/SQS-29-32), have been greatly reduced due to scrupulous care in dome handling and installation, and careful lubrication of the HVMG sets. Sonar problems face the Fleet in the future, however, in the prospective introduction of the AN/SQS-26 which is still undergoing technical evaluation and has yet to face operational evaluation. This extremely complex and costly equipment doubtless will require "fixes" backfitted into the production models as a result of the evaluation. Current production may not be able to incorporate these changes before delivery and installation due to the compressed time schedules. Delivery of satisfactory AN/SQS-23 series sonar transducers has been marginal in the past and has resulted in schedule changes. New developments in the field of VDS sonar appear to be fruitful. (SECRET)

j. Conclusions. Test equipment shortages, due to severely limited procurement funds, are being acutely felt. These shortages will not be completely satisfied for years to come, if ever. Specialized training is required for proper maintenance in all areas of electronics. (CONFIDENTIAL)

19. EW AND TACTICAL DECEPTION

a. ECM Readiness. Electronic intercept systems are performing below standard in relation to the tactical requirements. These systems must "look" beyond 300 miles to be of any real value and should be capable of detecting an enemy radar anywhere. Contrary to

popular opinion, the old-fashioned AN/SLR-2 and AN/BLR-1 equipments can do exactly this. The AN/WLR-1 is an electronically improved BLR-1 with a fast frequency tuning rate with a memory capability. The ECM equipment (SLR-2/BLR-1/WLR-1) installed in the Fleet is fully capable of meeting its tactical requirements when it is employed properly. (CONFIDENTIAL)

b. Passive and Early Warning Equipment. Currently, the airborne forces of the Atlantic Fleet are forced to operate with passive and early warning ECM equipment that is either antiquated or of such design that its operational capability is of questionable value. In this regard, the older equipment with inherent slow frequency scan rates and associated antenna problems is considered superior to the newer equipment (AN/ALD-2) suffering from failure to meet design specifications. The introduction of the ALD-2 into the Fleet with known deficiencies has instilled a lack of confidence in the equipment and the EW program in general. (SECRET)

c. Defensive ECM Readiness

(1) The DECM readiness of the Fleet has shown some slight improvement in recent months and potentially offers a major advantage in the accomplishment of assigned strike missions. Many of the earlier problems of DECM, particularly in Heavy Attack, still plague the readiness posture. There are insufficient quantities of DECM equipment in the inventory. A constant reassignment of equipments is required in order to provide the aircraft deployed with a complete suite of equipment. The introduction of the AN/ALQ-31 pod capable of carrying DECM equipment further aggravates this shortage. In addition to the above, reliability of the equipment has been poor. Area restrictions for exercising these equipments has limited actual in flight use to develop doctrine. A suitable portable "GO, NO GO" test device is urgently required to preflight all DECM equipments. The requirement exists to provide DECM protection to light attacks and reconnaissance aircraft. (SECRET)

The fact that some aircraft squadrons perform most creditably with the ECM equipment available is due to constant command attention and sincere interest in EW. There are equipments in the development stage that will meet this requirement providing they meet the specifications for which they were designed. Until such time as these newer equipments are evaluated and reach the Fleet, the VP, VS and VW squadrons will continue to be severely handicapped in the performance of their missions. There is a continuing need in this field for training and maintenance. Efforts must be continued to provide airborne forces with adequate passive ECM equipment. (SECRET)

(2) The only DECM equipment available for shipboard use is the AN/ULQ-6 target enhancer/break locks equipment. The usefulness of this equipment in the break locks mode against the more sophisticated Soviet air to surface missiles (AS-2, 3 and 4) is questionable. A requirement exists to provide surface forces with adequate DECM equipment. (SECRET)

d. HERO Readiness. Information being made available upon completion of NWL Dahlgren studies continues to improve readiness in the HERO area (hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance). Weapons (conventional, missiles and nuclear), fuels and personnel areas are susceptible to electromagnetic radiations that emanate from radars and communication equipments. Potential dangers to ordnance components are magnified with the attainment of sophistications in these areas. Current Fleet restrictions imposed by HERO are under study by NWL Dahlgren. The study group is well aware of the Task Force Commanders' operational problems and all efforts are being made to obtain tolerable solutions in this area. (CONFIDENTIAL)

e. **Tactical Deception Readiness**

(1) Recent task force overflights by Russian aircraft have pointed up the need to improve the Fleet capability to operate under a strict emission control (EMCON) policy when tactical deception is of primary importance. (SECRET)

(2) Tactical doctrine concerning the employment of 5"/38 chaff projectiles for deception is currently being evaluated. Development of operational tactics in this area will be forthcoming in a TACNOTE in the near future. (SECRET)

f. **Electronic Warfare Readiness.** Training in the EW field has suffered in the past because jamming equipment has not been available. This has resulted in an inadequate development of doctrine upon which to base operationally proven EW procedures. The lack of sophisticated DECM equipments to provide an adequate ECM environment continues to severely handicap ECCM training for all forces. Fleet ECCM readiness will remain unsatisfactory until adequate aircraft vehicles can be obtained with the reaffirmed DECM/Jamming equipments necessary to provide the proper ECCM training environment. (SECRET)

I. FLEET MARINE FORCE.

1. **GENERAL.** Throughout this period, Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic performed its function as a type command within the U. S. Atlantic Fleet. The operational readiness of the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic remained at a high level. The Force is capable of fulfilling assigned missions and can mount out a well trained combat ready Air/Ground team tailored in size, striking power, and combat potential for a wide range of military operations. The maximum capability for employment consists of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) composed of one Marine Division and one Marine Aircraft Wing supplemented as required by reinforcing units from Force Troops, FMFLANT. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. FLEET MARINE FORCE, AVIATION

a. Two new aviation deployments were initiated during the period. During October, the first six (6) Marine F-8 aircraft deployed to Key West, Florida reporting thereat to Commander, Key West Force for operational control. This contingency requirement is alternated each month between Naval Aircraft Atlantic Squadrons and those of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing. On 1 February, F4-B's of VMF (AW) 531 relieved those of VF-42 in providing air defense for the Southeastern United States at Key West, Florida under operational control of CONAD. As now planned this squadron will be relieved by an Air Force unit on or about 1 June 1963. (SECRET)

b. VMGR-252 continued receipt of the new KC-130F aircraft, reaching its squadron complement of twelve (12) aircraft in November 1962. VMF-353 will be deactivated 31 March 1963 and the C-119F aircraft phased out. (CONFIDENTIAL)

c. HMM-265 was activated by Marine Air Group 26 in September 1962. Additionally this helicopter group was assigned the task of training a portion of the 500 new Marine helicopter pilots urgently needed by the Marine Corps within the next two years. Helicopter units of MAG-26 continued to support Project Mercury operations throughout the period.

d. One VMA squadron, one VMF (AW) squadron and a Marine Air Control squadron were deployed to the Far East fully manned and trained, less aircraft and equipment in continuation of the Marine Corps unit rotation concept. Like units in cadre status were returned

SECRET

to the Atlantic Coast to begin again the long training cycle. One Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron and one Marine Fighter Squadron, deployed to the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet as part of Navy carrier air groups, returned to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing in August 1962. Carrier qualification was completed by two Marine attack squadrons, four Marine fighter and all-weather fighter squadrons and VMCJ-2. One 2d Marine Aircraft Wing fighter or attack squadron was deployed to the Caribbean area at all times during the year with a detachment of four aircraft based at Leeward Point. (SECRET)

e. The training highlight of the year was a Trans-Atlantic flight of 16 A-4C aircraft from MCAS, Cherry Point, North Carolina to NS, Rota, Spain and return during the period 8-17 October 1962. The training objective of Operation Highboy were to provide training and to determine the capability of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing to conduct a mission of this scope within its own resources. Utilizing 2d Wing C-130F refuelers, the flight proceeded via Bermuda, Lajes, to Rota and return without incident. (SECRET)

3. FLEET MARINE FORCE, GROUND

a. The major addition to Fleet Marine Force units this year was provided by the early transfer of the 3d Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalion (LAAM) to FMFLANT from Twenty-nine Palms, California. Flown to the east coast for temporary deployment early in the Cuban crisis, the transfer was made permanent as of 1 February 1963. As part of the Anti-air weapons system, the 3d LAAM Battalion is attached to the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing and based at Cherry Point, N.C. (SECRET)

b. The Heavy Artillery Rocket Battery (HARB) was placed in a cadre status 1 March March 1963 and is to be deactivated 1 May 1963. This eliminates the only Fleet Marine Force capability for ground weapon delivery of an intermediate yield nuclear weapon.

c. Battalion Landing teams have been provided continuously to Commander SIXTH Fleet with each rotation of Fleet units to the Mediterranean. SOLANT AMITY IV, with embarked Marines departed CONUS in February with a scheduled return in May 1963.

d. A battalion Landing Team has been deployed to the Caribbean area on a continuous basis. Three Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) each consisting of a battalion landing team plus supporting aviation units conducted amphibious training in the Caribbean area during the period. Two PHIBEX battalion landing teams provided interim contingency forces in the area between deployed MEU forces. Each rotating MEU or PHIBEX battalion provided a reinforced Marine rifle company to augment the Guantanamo defense forces. In-position relief is provided to insure continuous augmentation.

e. Exercise HIGH HEELS provided excellent training for II MEF Staff. The Fourth Marine Expeditionary Brigade Staff mounted out for a major training exercise on Vieques in October. However, the Cuban crisis interrupted the exercise and the forces and staff were then absorbed and deployed as part of II MEF contingency forces. (CONFIDENTIAL)

J. DOCTRINE. During the reporting period the Atlantic Fleet completed the reviews of forty-three tactical doctrine publications. Again, significant improvements were made in ASW tactics. A complete revision to ASW barrier tactics was submitted to CNO for promulgation in NWIP 1-4. During this period, CINCLANTFLT established a uniform and coordinated system, using TACNOTES as the vehicle to promulgate and evaluate experimental tactics and associated operating procedures within the Atlantic Fleet. This program is being emphasized to speed up the development and promulgation of new and improved tactical doctrine. (CONFIDENTIAL)

PART VI

MATERIAL READINESS

A. HULL AND MACHINERY. Material readiness in the hull and machinery category received an unscheduled test during the Cuban crisis. This operation required ships to remain at sea for relatively long periods. Hurried departures, many in the middle of upkeep, with no advance preparations for such extended operations, put the spotlight on routine material readiness. Casualty reporting increased markedly during the crisis as would be expected from the increased tempo of operations, but at no time was the Fleet's ability to carry out assigned tasks impaired. The deleterious effect of ship's age was demonstrated statistically in that ships built before 1950 experienced approximately twice the number of casualties as the new ships. This lends support to a vigorous shipbuilding program designed for the early conversion and/or replacement of our overage ships.

B. ELECTRONICS MATERIAL. New installations of Single Sideband Radio equipment are being performed as fast as new deliveries are made. This is producing a significant improvement in communications capabilities in the Fleet.

New long range air search radars and height finding radars are being introduced in significant numbers. After some early adjustments, these are producing greatly increased performance with only minor difficulties.

The Atlantic Fleet has shifted from 60 to 100 word per minute teletype operation. At first, this produced an avalanche of maintenance problems, due to the necessity for closer tolerance adjustments, and stringent lubrication and cleanliness routines. With the increased emphasis on teletype maintenance, and the beginning of introduction of replacement high speed machines, these problems are reducing to manageable proportions.

The problems of sonar "spoking", due to noisy sonar domes, and frequent high-voltage motor generator failure in the RDT series sonars (AN/SQS-29-32), have been greatly reduced, due to scrupulous care in dome handling and installation, and careful lubrication of the HVMG sets. Sonar problems face the Fleet in the future, however, in the prospective introduction of the AN/SQS-26, which is still undergoing technical evaluation. This extremely complex and costly equipment doubtless will require "fixes" backfitted into the production models as a result of the evaluation, but the current production may not be able to incorporate these changes before delivery and installation due to the compressed time schedules.

Delivery of satisfactory AN/SQS-23 series sonar transducers has been marginal in the past and has resulted in schedule changes.

New developments in the field of VDS sonar appear to be fruitful.

Test equipment shortages, due to severely limited procurement funds, are being acutely felt. These shortages will not be completely satisfied for years to come, if ever.

C. ORDNANCE MATERIAL

1. NON-EXPENDABLE ORDNANCE MATERIAL. The condition of the older fire control systems, weapons launchers, and guns is generally satisfactory. The advent of new, more complex weapons systems such as Surface-to-Air missile systems, ASROC, DASH, and the newer ASW Torpedo Director Systems has required increased maintenance effort to keep reliability

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to a satisfactory level and has raised the problem of adequate supply of spare parts. The Bureau of Naval Weapons and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts are striving to obtain more usage data so that better inventories of spare parts may be carried.

2. **EXPENDABLE ORDNANCE.** The shortages of expendable ordnance shown below currently exist and are based on estimated requirements for carrying out a contingency operation. These shortages have been reported to the Navy Department and steps are being taken to rectify them within budgetary limitations.

| <u>STRIKE ORDNANCE</u> | <u>INVENTORY</u> | <u>45 DAY REQUIREMENT</u> |
|------------------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| 1000# Fire Bombs | 2,410 | 8,274 |
| 250# Low Drag Bombs | 21,728 | 45,275 |
| 500# Low Drag Bombs | 18,301 | 31,458 |
| ZUNI Rockets | 4,486 | 6,768 |
| <u>ASW ORDNANCE</u> | <u>INVENTORY</u> | <u>90 DAY REQUIREMENT</u> |
| MK 44 Torpedoes | 714 | 7,199 |
| MK 37 Torpedoes | 976 | 1,518 |
| ASROC Missiles | 336 | 1,118 |

D. **AVIATION MATERIAL.** Spare parts and ground support equipment for the newer models of aircraft such as the F4B, A6A, and P3A are in short supply and are adversely affecting readiness and operational flexibility. Navy Department personnel have indicated that the FY 1964 purchase of spares and support equipment will improve the situation to some extent, but that functional base loading (basing all aircraft of the same model at one place) may be required in the case of the A6A and F4B. Aircraft accident rates have been decreasing. Some concern is felt because of CVA catapult accidents although these accidents are primarily of personnel and maintenance nature rather than poor design.

E. **SUPPLY.** An accurate analysis of Fleet Supply readiness cannot be made at this time. Allowance list shortages can only be estimated (currently about \$22.5 million), due to the methods of collecting and reporting these shortages. The extent and effect of material shortages on Fleet operations are neither being properly analyzed for Fleet command and control nor being proven for the budgetary process. Technical complexity of our weapons systems has increased to the point where conventional manual data processing cannot cope with increasing supply readiness problems.

To analyze supply readiness accurately we must have an automated material information and management system in the Fleet based on simple, sound budgeting, funding and accounting concepts. Suggestions to this effect have been made to CNO.

Items of interest which will contribute to Fleet Supply readiness are as follows:

1. The Fleet Material Essentiality Coding Program, which has as an objective the establishment of a basis whereby ships and squadrons can formally evaluate the relative military importance of on board equipments, components, and eventually repair parts, will permit concentration of efforts and use of funds on those items most critical to a ship's operation.
2. The introduction in July, 1963, of Fleet Oriented Consolidated Stock Lists which will substantially reduce the voluminous supply catalogs aboard ship and will simplify the statement of material requirements by ships.

3. The further development of procedures by the Polaris Material Office at Charleston, S.C., which monitors all material requirements from deployed FBM forces will insure the continuation of an effective logistics support system for these forces. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. The continuing improvement in the Fleet's ability to operate under the Navy Standard Requisitioning and Issue System, introduced in July, 1962, should result in improved supply effectiveness. (CONFIDENTIAL)

The effects of the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) on Fleet Supply Readiness are not clear at this time. There has been some concern for the restrictive credit policy regarding excess material turned in ashore by Fleet units. Changes in equipment and allowance lists do result in repair part excesses and deficiencies. Our Fleet units need to receive credit for these excesses to help fund known material shortages. Navy retail stocks of DSA controlled items are presently sufficient to meet from 75% to 85% of our initial demands, which figures compare favorable to those items completely controlled by the Navy. (CONFIDENTIAL)

F. FUNDING. Growth in overhaul costs during the first nine months of FY 1963, plus CNO disapproval of a recommendation to defer several overhauls from June to July to compensate for the resultant deficit, necessitated curtailing worklists on overhauls commencing 15 March - 30 June 1963 by about 10% below the estimated cost predicted for thorough overhauls.

Restricted and Technical Availability funds for FY 63 were allocated initially at about 75% of estimated requirements in the amount of \$22.8 million. Extra costs due to Cuban Operations were \$1.2 million. Relief in the amount of about \$1 million is expected. The remaining deficit is being managed by deferring some work (e.g. LCU overhauls) and by accepting reduced readiness on a case basis (e.g. one boiler out of four in a DD out of commission for several months pending scheduled overhaul). (CONFIDENTIAL)

Supplies and Equipage Funds - short funding of S&E during the past years has resulted in serious deficiencies in equipage and repair parts in the Atlantic Fleet. S&E funds provided were insufficient thereby causing ships to eat down inventories off the shelf. Deficiencies at the end of FY 62 were estimated to be \$13 million. At the end of FY 63 these deficiencies are estimated to be \$22.5 million. (CONFIDENTIAL)

TAD - Funding level for Fleet TAD at the beginning of FY 63 was 45%. This was grossly insufficient to support the travel required for training Fleet personnel which normally represents 80% of the travel requirements. Subsequent augmentations as well as a reduced travel requirement during Cuban operations has placed the Atlantic Fleet in a relatively improved TAD situation. Known requirements can be met within existing funds allocated.

G. POL. During the period covered by this report POL logistical support posture for general war has improved considerably. The POL steaming endurance of the strike fleet has been increased from 28 to 59 days, or a little more than doubled. The objective is 75 days. This increase in support capability is attributed to special effort to acquire POL storage at selective locations. NSFO storage was acquired as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Invergordon, Scotland | 713 M Barrels |
| Lyness, Scotland | 830 M Barrels |
| El Ferrol, Spain | 316 M Barrels |
| Hvalfjordur, Iceland | 175 M Barrels (plus 106 M Barrels for JP-5) |
| TOTAL | 2,034 M Barrels |

SECRET

In addition, 200 M Barrels at Rota, Spain was acquired. The Rota storage is allocated to support of HUK operations in the MIDLANT area. This raises HUK support capability in the vicinity of the Azores from zero to an estimated 75 days support capability.

A continuing problem is the malpositioning of steaming fuel reserve stocks to support operations in the MIDLANT area. Due to lack of storage facilities in this area, 84% of required reserves are physically stored in fuel depots on the U. S. East Coast. It is expected that this situation will not be alleviated until the completion of NATO infrastructure storage in 1965-66. (SECRET)

H. GENERAL. The overall material condition of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet is determined by three factors:

1. "Block Obsolescence" of WW II built ships;

2. The number of new construction and FRAMMED ships received in the Fleet each year to offset the "Block Obsolescence"; and

3. Increased complexity of the modern ships.

The number of new construction and FRAM ships received per year has not kept pace with the number of ships becoming overage each year. This has caused a general degradation of the Fleet's material condition. With respect to the increased complexities, this problem, though not completely solved, is now being handled with more maintenance efficiency than several years ago.

The proof of the overall material condition of the Fleet was proven during the Cuban crisis when not one ship had to be released from operations because of material casualties. (CONFIDENTIAL)

PART VII

ADMINISTRATION

A. Fleet Enlisted Personnel Summary for eight (8) months period of Fiscal Year 1963 (30 June 1962 - 28 February 1963) follows:

1. STRENGTH

| <u>DATE</u> | <u>ALLOWANCE</u> | <u>ON BOARD</u> | <u>%</u> |
|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| 30 June 1962 | 191,129 | 186,237 | 97.4 |
| 28 February 1963 | <u>190,053</u> | <u>187,534</u> | <u>98.7</u> |
| | -1,076 | +1,297 | +1.3 |

BILLET ALLOCATION CHANGES

a. Commissioned, established, or received from Pacific Fleet, and Enlisted Personnel Distribution Office, Continental United States (for distributional control):

| | | |
|---------|---------|--------|
| 1 UDT | 21 MISC | 1 LPH |
| 10 SSBN | 1 PCH | 1 AVM |
| 2 SS | 1 LPD | 1 AN |
| 3 DDG | 1 SSN | 1 CVS |
| 1 DLG | 1 AFDL | 12 LST |
| 5 OSEAS | 1 PTF | |

TOTAL: 40 SHIPS 27 ACTIVITIES

b. Decommissioned, disestablished, or transferred to Pacific Fleet and Enlisted Personnel Distribution Office, Continental United States (for distributional control):

| | | | |
|--------|---------|-------|---------|
| 1 DLG | 2 VF | 4 VP | 2 DD |
| 1 CVS | 1 HS | 9 VS | 1 AN |
| 2 AKA | 3 VA | 1 AVM | 1 DE |
| 1 CVSG | 1 DDG | 1 CLG | 1 CVA |
| 1 CVG | 8 OSEAS | 1 AVB | 25 MISC |

TOTAL: 13 SHIPS 19 AIR SQUADRONS 35 ACTIVITIES

2. QUALITY

| <u>PAY GRADE</u> | <u>ALLOWANCE</u> | <u>ON BOARD</u> | <u>28 FEB 63</u> | <u>30 JUN 62</u> |
|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| CPO | 13,916 | 12,456 | 89.5 | 97.2 |
| PO1 | 26,162 | 20,051 | 76.6 | 75.3 |
| PO2 | 34,740 | 28,541 | 82.2 | 93.2 |
| PO3 | 44,955 | 39,875 | 90.3 | 98.4 |
| TOTAL | 119,733 | 100,923 | 84.3 | 91.8 |

The following tabulation lists ratings considered critical, in that the on board strength is under 85% of requirements in either total rating group, total PO3's and strikers, or leading petty officers:

| RATING | % Allowance CPO, PO1, and PO2 | No. Under Allowance Leaders | % Allowance total PO3s and No. Under Strikers | % Total Allowance | No. Under Ratings | % Total Allowance |
|--|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | | | | | | |
| Quartermaster | 67.9 | - 520 | 116.9 | + 114 | 82.2 | - 406 |
| Signalman | 78.4 | - 265 | 97.2 | - 21 | 85.5 | - 286 |
| Radarman | 64.1 | - 782 | 99.9 | - 2 | 83.6 | - 784 |
| Sonarman | 55.7 | - 754 | 102.2 | + 28 | 73.7 | - 782 |
| Torpedoman's Mate | 78.4 | - 322 | 88.9 | - 105 | 82.5 | - 427 |
| Gunner's Mate (T) | 60.4 | - 98 | 91.7 | - 19 | 75.5 | - 117 |
| Fire Control Technician | 64.5 | - 677 | 127.8 | + 375 | 90.7 | - 302 |
| Missile Technician | 42.8 | - 313 | 83.7 | - 74 | 61.3 | - 387 |
| Electronics Technician | 50.3 | - 1882 | 127.6 | + 690 | 81.7 | - 1128 |
| Data System Technician | 31.7 | - 43 | 0.0 | + 3 | 36.5 | - 40 |
| Instrumentman | 77.3 | - 24 | 183.9 | + 47 | 114.1 | + 23 |
| Opticalman | 82.8 | - 19 | 150.7 | + 36 | 109.3 | + 17 |
| Radioman | 69.6 | - 1288 | 103.4 | + 136 | 85.9 | - 1152 |
| Yeoman | 81.4 | - 467 | 119.1 | + 284 | 95.4 | - 183 |
| Disbursing Clerk | 79.1 | - 125 | 211.6 | + 201 | 109.7 | + 76 |
| Journalist | 66.6 | - 37 | 240.4 | + 59 | 114.3 | + 22 |
| Draftsman | 67.2 | - 37 | 198.4 | + 62 | 114.2 | + 25 |
| Machinist's Mate | 71.9 | - 1518 | 131.2 | + 1008 | 94.0 | - 510 |
| Engineman | 84.9 | - 478 | 141.5 | + 727 | 105.0 | + 249 |
| Machinery Repairman | 83.0 | - 127 | 175.4 | + 313 | 115.9 | + 186 |
| Boiler Repairman | 37.9 | - 157 | 0.0 | - | 37.9 | - 157 |
| Electrician's Mate | 76.1 | - 880 | 142.7 | + 1014 | 102.2 | + 134 |
| Interior Communications Electrician | 58.6 | - 672 | 220.3 | + 1164 | 118.9 | + 492 |
| Ship Fitters | 83.1 | - 398 | 108.5 | + 109 | 92.0 | - 289 |
| Damage Controlman | 82.2 | - 171 | 113.6 | + 57 | 91.7 | - 114 |
| Pattern Makers | 60.8 | - 18 | 216.0 | + 29 | 115.4 | + 11 |
| Engineering Aid | 66.6 | - 14 | 375.0 | + 44 | 151.7 | + 39 |
| Construction Electrician | 78.0 | - 43 | 183.9 | + 94 | 116.5 | + 51 |
| AX | 53.1 | - 229 | 77.1 | - 125 | 65.7 | - 354 |
| Aviation Fire Control Technician | 78.8 | - 80 | 86.8 | - 47 | 82.7 | - 127 |
| Aviation Boatswain Mate | 84.2 | - 135 | 179.1 | + 439 | 121.4 | + 304 |
| Aerographers Mate | 82.9 | - 45 | 139.1 | + 87 | 108.6 | + 42 |
| Photographic Intelligenceman | 82.3 | - 18 | 88.0 | - 12 | 84.6 | - 26 |

3. U. S. Atlantic Fleet Reenlistment Rate for eight (8) months of Fiscal Year 1963, (30 June - 28 February 1963) compared with Fiscal Year 1962:

| 1962 | FIRST CRUISE | | | CAREER | | | OVERALL | | |
|---------------|--------------|------|------|--------|-------|------|---------|-------|------|
| | DISCH | REEN | % | DISCH | REEN | % | DISCH | REEN | % |
| COMTRALANT | 38 | 16 | 42.1 | 167 | 152 | 91.0 | 205 | 168 | 82.0 |
| COMSUBLANT | 2388 | 846 | 37.0 | 1772 | 1320 | 74.5 | 4060 | 2166 | 53.3 |
| COMINLANT | 539 | 156 | 28.9 | 350 | 252 | 72.0 | 889 | 408 | 45.9 |
| COMSTS LANT | 46 | 15 | 32.6 | 55 | 44 | 80.0 | 101 | 59 | 58.4 |
| COMPHIBLANT | 2228 | 409 | 18.4 | 1075 | 784 | 72.9 | 3303 | 1193 | 36.1 |
| COMSERVLANT | 2546 | 490 | 19.2 | 1172 | 835 | 71.2 | 3718 | 1325 | 35.6 |
| COMNAVAIRLANT | 8922 | 1800 | 20.2 | 3842 | 2977 | 77.5 | 12764 | 4777 | 37.4 |
| COMCRUDESLANT | 8964 | 1581 | 17.6 | 3167 | 2357 | 74.4 | 12131 | 3938 | 32.5 |
| COMNAV CBLANT | 394 | 81 | 20.6 | 216 | 156 | 72.2 | 610 | 237 | 38.9 |
| ALL OTHERS | 1767 | 492 | 27.8 | 1602 | 1318 | 82.3 | 3369 | 1810 | 53.7 |
| FLEET TOTAL | 27732 | 5866 | 21.2 | 13418 | 10195 | 76.0 | 41150 | 16981 | 39.1 |

| 1963 | FIRST CRUISE | | | CAREER | | | OVERALL | | |
|---------------|--------------|------|------|--------|------|------|---------|------|------|
| | DISCH | REEN | % | DISCH | REEN | % | DISCH | REEN | % |
| COMTRALANT | 41 | 23 | 56.1 | 175 | 161 | 92.0 | 216 | 184 | 85.2 |
| COMSUBLANT | 1839 | 531 | 28.9 | 1075 | 829 | 77.1 | 2914 | 1360 | 46.7 |
| COMINLANT | 309 | 63 | 20.4 | 217 | 152 | 70.0 | 526 | 215 | 40.9 |
| COMSTSLANT | 18 | 2 | 11.1 | 35 | 31 | 88.6 | 53 | 33 | 62.4 |
| COMPHIBLANT | 1948 | 218 | 11.2 | 744 | 547 | 73.5 | 2692 | 765 | 28.4 |
| COMSERVLANT | 1683 | 234 | 13.9 | 747 | 524 | 70.1 | 2430 | 758 | 31.2 |
| COMNAVAIRLANT | 5938 | 920 | 15.5 | 2484 | 1929 | 77.7 | 8422 | 2849 | 33.8 |
| COMCRUDESLANT | 6377 | 650 | 10.2 | 2104 | 1500 | 71.3 | 8481 | 2150 | 25.4 |
| COMNAVCBLANT | 187 | 34 | 18.2 | 92 | 63 | 68.5 | 279 | 97 | 34.8 |
| ALL OTHERS | 1168 | 256 | 21.9 | 930 | 719 | 77.3 | 2098 | 975 | 46.5 |
| FLEET TOTAL | 19508 | 2931 | 15.0 | 8603 | 6455 | 75.0 | 28111 | 9386 | 33.4 |

4. FLEET SHORE DUTY. On 28 February 1963 there were 14,534 enlisted personnel serving on fleet shore duty. Total requirements were 14,038.

5. OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES. On 28 February 1963 there were 15,908 enlisted personnel serving in fleet overseas service. Total requirements were 15,276.

B. MORALE

1. STATUS. Morale in the U. S. Atlantic Fleet has continued its high level of excellence during the year 1963.

2. FACTORS WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO EXCELLENT MORALE ARE:

a. A heightened awareness of the importance of Sea-Power in international affairs, as evidenced by the role which units of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet played in recent Caribbean operations.

b. Shortened length of deployments for many units of the Fleet.

c. Increased efforts on behalf of commands in creating Enlisted Wives Clubs in ships in the Fleet, and additional means of establishing communications between the command and the families such as "family-grams" and dependent briefings prior to deployment.

d. Emphasis on improved ship board habitability and more adequate recreational facilities, both afloat and ashore.

e. In addition to the above, it is noted that the highest degree of morale exists in those units which vigorously support the Protection of Moral Standards program as outlined in BUPERS Instruction 1730.7 and Naval Leadership as set forth in BUPERS Instruction 5390.2A, as well as maintaining the highest standards of traditional Naval conduct and performance.

C. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

1. There are currently one hundred ninety-eight (198) chaplains assigned to units of the Atlantic Fleet. Every effort has been made to provide divine services for all ships and units of the fleet. Providing maximum religious coverage of ships while deployed presents a challenge to both the commands and the individual chaplains. Only through the cooperation of commands in providing transportation and facilities to chaplains, and the willingness of chaplains to extend their efforts to commands beyond their own, has the religious program been able to achieve its high degree of effectiveness.

2. To augment the work of chaplains and to insure regular worship opportunities for ships to which chaplains are not attached an increased emphasis has been placed on the religious Lay Leader Program in the Atlantic Fleet. Division, squadron and force chaplains, as well as the Fleet Chaplain, have held conferences and workshops for Lay Leaders for the purpose of increasing their competence and inspiring them in carrying out this important religious endeavor. In addition, the Fleet Chaplain has initiated the promulgation of a monthly lay leader newsletter, designed to furnish informational items, practical hints and inspiring ideas for each designated lay leader in ships and units of the Fleet. The second annual Atlantic Fleet Lay Leaders Conference will be held on 28 May 1963 in Norfolk, Virginia, as a further means of embracing the effectiveness of the lay leader effort.

3. In addition to carrying out their religious duties, chaplains of the fleet have earned an outstanding reputation as wise and sincere counselors of the officers and men of the fleet as well as their dependents. The problems brought to the chaplains for counsel have run the gauntlet of human behavior and emotional conflicts.

4. The Fleet Chaplain provided logistical support to chaplains of the fleet and designated lay leaders by furnishing all ecclesiastical equipment and consumable supplies required to carry out their religious ministry to personnel of the fleet.

5. The morale of chaplains assigned to ships and units of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet is of the highest order and their professional competence is attested to by the positive results of their efforts.

D. LEGAL AND DISCIPLINE

1. Disciplinary action within the Atlantic Fleet is taken by subordinate commands except when the Commander in Chief issues a Letter of Censure to an officer. General Court-Martial cases are tried by Commander Service Force and Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Review of Special Court-Martial and Summary Court-Martial cases are made by type commanders, all of whom have law specialists attached to their staffs. There has been no significant change in the state of discipline.

2. A one week seminar in Naval Justice was conducted in Norfolk and attended by some 250 officers. In addition Commander Service Force holds a 6 hour seminar on the UCMJ each month for COs and XOs and a 2 day seminar each month for court-martial members and unit legal officers.

3. The casualty rate (collisions, groundings, engineering failures) continues to be too high, notwithstanding constant efforts by Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet and Type Commanders to bring about an appreciable reduction in the number of casualties.

4. Conduct of personnel overseas has been excellent and no difficulties experienced in connection with foreign criminal jurisdiction over Naval personnel.

E. DENTAL HEALTH

1. Dental care administered in the LANTFLT activities during the Fiscal Year 1963 was similar in scope to that of previous years. Inservice training of dental technicians, preventive dentistry, oral hygiene lectures, and a closer LANTFLT Dental Officer - Force Dental Officer relationship have been important contributions to the LANTFLT dental service. Intensification of dental service has been the keynote.

2. The objective of the LANTFLT Dental Service is to coordinate Fleet Support Dental Activities to provide the greatest amount of the best dental service possible for the Fleet personnel with the dental personnel and facilities available. Dental health of LANTFLT personnel can be classed as very good.

3. Training of personnel has been carried out with the objective of maintaining and effective state of readiness; and to keep abreast of the technological advances made in medicine dentistry, science and research, and to disseminate such information for the benefit of all, both civilian and military. Training of personnel has been conducted with normal operation and training periods in conformity with current directives. Close coordination of the dental department with other departments has been consistently enforced in the training of personnel for operational readiness.

4. An intensive educational program in preventive dentistry for patients is in effect. This has resulted in better oral hygiene with less recurrence of dental disease.

5. Dental supplies and equipment have been available in sufficient quantity to keep stock at a satisfactory operating level. Quality of dental material continues to be excellent, but some ships have experienced difficulty in obtaining "stock items" utilizing normal order points and lead periods.

6. A vigorous photodosimetry program is being conducted, in accordance with current instructions, providing adequate radiation protection for patients and for personnel operating roentgenographic equipment.

7. The authorized allowance for dental personnel has been maintained with very little loss of time between transfers. Assignments have been made consistent with the overall need of activities on the basis of availability and in accordance with Fleet percentages. (Currently, all allowances are filled with no surpluses.)

8. Alterations and improvements in dental facilities consisted of additional working spaces, relocation of equipment, air conditioning, and a concentrated program for better illumination. CINCLANTFLT Dental Officer disseminated information and standards for lighting surveys aboard ship.

9. Naval Dental Clinic, Norfolk, Virginia provides 700-900 appointments weekly for operative procedures for personnel from LANTFLT in addition to providing specialist capabilities, i. e., periodontics, surgery, and prosthodontics to the fullest extent commensurate with the size of the facility and number of personnel.

10. LANTFLT Dental Officer correlated the completion of dental work for all personnel assigned to SOLANT AMITY prior to deployment and subsequently placed one dental officer and one technician plus a dental field unit on the USS SPIEGEL GROVE to participate in this operation.

11. CINCLANTFLT Dental Officer held monthly conferences with Force Dental Officers or their designated representatives to insure that all forces collaborated in attaining a standardized method of examining and classifying patients to aid the Medical Department Representative aboard ships, to insure that all personnel "get the word," to solve problems unique to one force or common to all, and to work in harmony toward one goal - more and better dental treatment for the Fleet. Each Force Dental Officer has submitted a job analysis, complete with facility photographs, to the LANTFLT Dental Officer.

12. The additional duty billet of Administrative Assistant to the LANTFLT Dental Officer was obtained and filled. This has aided materially in the prompt and efficient completion of LANTFLT dental administrative procedures.

F. MEDICAL HEALTH

1. The paucity of trained or partially trained surgeons continues to hamper the medical readiness of certain Fleet units, particularly the Amphibious Force and Fleet Marine Force. The ready availability of Surgical Teams to augment the Operating Forces in time of

emergency was tested and found satisfactory in most respects when thirteen of the teams were deployed on extremely short notice with the Amphibious Force and the Fleet Marine Force during the Cuban Contingency Action. Shortcomings noted are in the process of, or have been corrected.

2. The ratio of medical officers in the Fleet is approximately 1.47 per thousand personnel. Although this is adequate for normal requirements, it has been necessary on occasions to request that BUPERS furnish medical officers for temporary assignment for special operations and deployments.

3. The overall allowance of hospital corpsmen is considered adequate, although shortages still exist in certain specialties.

4. The National Blood Donor Program continues to receive support from Fleet Ships, Units, and Shore Activities. Current CINCLANTFLT Instructions require commanding officers to maintain a continuous blood donor program which in turn is coordinated locally with the National Program. The response of Fleet activities to this worthwhile cause has been most gratifying.

G. PUBLIC INFORMATION

1. During the period of this report, 1 July 1962 to 30 April 1963, the Fleet Information Office has continued to emphasize the U. S. Navy's public information objectives. Close liaison with the Chief of Information, Naval District Commandants, and Atlantic Fleet subordinate commands resulted in considerable public recognition of the Navy's contribution to the national defense effort. The Fleet Information Office utilized local and regional news media directly and, through the Chief of Information, national and international news media. All media were serviced through the normal public relations techniques, such as press conferences with the Commander in Chief, photo and press releases, television footage, radio coverage, special events, and routine answering of news queries. Close cooperating and personal relationships with local radio, television, and newspaper representatives assisted in obtaining favorable publicity for the Navy.

2. A total of 197 photographs and news releases were issued by the Fleet Information Office, not including subjects directed for release below the Fleet level. Subjects included Fleet operations, personnel, facilities, training, and special events.

3. A total of six press conferences were arranged for local and national news representatives with the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet concerning subjects within the Fleet. The majority of these press conferences were held during or shortly after the Atlantic Fleet naval quarantine of Cuba in the fall of 1962. Wide coverage of the Navy's role in national defense was facilitated by these press conferences.

4. The Fleet Information Office handled approximately 30 news queries per week during the period of this report, again most of them concerning the naval quarantine of Cuba. However, most of these queries during the Cuban blockade concerned operations in a CINCLANT capacity and were referred to OSD (PA).

5. Visits to the CINCLANTFLT headquarters and ships and installations within the fleet accounted for hundreds of man hours. Visits to the Guantanamo Naval Base required escorts, which were furnished by the Fleet Information Office, the Chief of Information, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (PA). There was a total of 136 newsmen who visited the Guantanamo Naval Base. In addition there were entertainment groups that visited Guantanamo, such as the Perry Como Show and the Ed Sullivan Show. There were 83 visits to the Fleet Information Office by news representatives to attend press conferences or seeking information. In addition, news representatives' visits to ships of the fleet totaled in the hundreds; it is not

possible to obtain an exact number of such visits.

6. A large amount of time and effort was expended in supplying public information guidance to Atlantic Fleet subordinate commands. Fleet Information Officers and personnel were required in some cases to go on Temporary Additional Duty to insure proper news coverage of events in the Fleet.

7. The Fleet Information Office was responsible for writing public information annexes to all Atlantic Fleet Operation Orders and Operation Plans, both of a classified and unclassified nature. In addition, the Fleet Information Office was required to supply guidance and qualified personnel for operations, cruises, and exercises, such as SOLANT AMITY IV, UNITAS III, Annual Midshipman's cruises, amphibious exercises, and Naval/Marine fire-power demonstrations.

8. The Graphic Arts Section of the Fleet Information Office noted an increased requirement for color slide briefings during the reporting period. This is reflected by a partial list of other commands obtaining graphic arts support in addition to the staff of the Commander in Chief: Atlantic Intelligence Center, Nuclear Weapons Training Center, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Antisubmarine Warfare Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Submarine Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Fleet Air Wings, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, Fleet Operational Control Center, Commander SECOND Fleet, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla FOUR, and Commander Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.

CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT requirements have increased both in number of presentations and level of presentations. Many top level government and military organizations received presentations during the reporting period. These included the President, Secretaries of State, Defense, and Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Director of National Security, the House Appropriations Committee and numerous congressional groups.

The Graphic Arts section produced in excess of nine thousand 35mm color slides during the reporting period. Notable among the projects undertaken by the section during the past ten months were:

- a. Major Brochures designed and produced.
 - (1) Project Handclasp.
 - (2) SOLANT AMITY IV.
- b. Major presentations prepared.
 - (1) Admiral Dennison's House Appropriations Committee Briefing.
 - (2) President Kennedy's visit to Fort Stewart.
 - (3) Polaris Reliability presentation.
 - (4) Presentation for Joint Chiefs of Staff.
 - (5) Presentation for Central Intelligence Agency.

9. The Photographic Section of the Fleet Information Office provided extensive photographic coverage of all news events of local, national, and international interest, including visits by U. S. and foreign dignitaries. In cooperation with the Atlantic Fleet Mobile Photographic

Group, wide coverage was obtained in both still and motion picture photography of all newsworthy events during the period of this report.

In addition to serving the Fleet Information Office, a great amount of support was provided other divisions of the headquarters staff, including major support to Intelligence, Plans, Operations, and Legal, and the CINCLANTFLT Presentations Division. A total of 26, 589 photographs were processed, including 35mm color slides, lantern slides, 8x10 single weight glossy prints for release to news media, and other miscellaneous sizes.

In addition to furnishing photographic support to CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT, the Fleet Information Office Photographic Lab provided photographic assistance to COMOCEAN-SYSLANT; COMTRALANT; CO ASW TACTICAL SCHOOL; CO NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRAINING CENTER; COMASWFORLANT; COMOPTEVFOR; COMSUBLANT; CG FMFLANT; CO FLEET TRAINING CENTER; CO ATLANTIC FLEET INTELLIGENCE CENTER; and COMDESFLOT FOUR.

Official portrait work was also provided to CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT and subordinate commands without portrait facilities. Included in this category were numerous ID photos and pictures for officers jackets and roster boards.

10. Additionally, the Fleet Information Office is responsible for preparing and presenting a daily, morning news summary, Monday through Friday, at the Commander in Chief Atlantic and U. S. Atlantic Fleet morning briefings. The briefers are provided from the Fleet Information Office with graphic assistance from the Photographic and Graphic Arts sections.

11. A sampling of events which received more than routine public information handling is listed:

| | |
|-------------------------|--|
| 6 July to 7 August 1962 | Midshipman's Cruise to Canada aboard Atlantic Fleet ships. |
| 18 July | Thirty-two newsmen from the Third Naval District visited CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT. |
| 5-12 July | 20th Century Fox camera crew aboard USS ENTERPRISE to film documentary. |
| 6-18 July | USS DANIEL JOY Great Lakes Cruise. |
| 11 July | Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development) John H. Wakelin visit. |
| 12 July | Naval Research Advisory Committee cruise aboard USS ENTERPRISE. |
| 19 July | News representatives from eight Canadian newspapers visit ENTERPRISE and witness Midshipman training activities. |
| 19-20 July | Two scholastic magazine editors visit USS SHARK and participate in flight aboard Navy "Hurricane Hunter." |
| 26-28 July | "Operation Enterprise," 51 newspaper carriers visit USS ENTERPRISE, sponsored by Navy League and Newspaper Enterprise Association. |

- 3-8 August** **U. S. SECOND Fleet begins North Atlantic Cruise.**
- 12-15 August** **Annual Legion of Valor Convention held in Newport News, Virginia. 150 members and wives attended.**
- 13 August** **Vice Admiral L. O. Brasil, Brazilian Navy, began two-day visit.**
- 15 August** **37 Educators, sponsored by the Navy League's "Education for Educators" Program, began two-day visit to local naval installations.**
- 21 August** **SUBICEX-62.**
- 27 August** **32 newsmen from the Eighth Naval District began three-day visit.**
- 28 August** **General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Chairman Designate Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet.**
- 1 September** **Cubans fired on Navy S2F aircraft over international waters on 30 August. Incident revealed on this date when Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet released White House statement during press conference.**
- 4 September** **Cuban Air Force pilot Jose Diaz-Vaquez defected from Cuba in his Czech-built Z-326 trainer and landed at the Key West Naval Air Station.**
- 4 September to 6 October** **60th Anniversary of the Destroyer Navy. USS LAWRENCE made Great Lakes Cruise.**
- 9-10 September** **NATO Parliamentarians visited local naval ships and installations.**
- 11 September** **Rear Admiral John L. Chew, USN, COMCRUDES-FLOT FOUR presented Legion of Merit by the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet for service in connection with Project Mercury.**
- 17-18 September** **20 journalists from North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations visited CINCLANTFLT facilities.**
- 18 September** **Honorable G. Mennan Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, visited the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet.**
- 24 September** **30 Newsmen from the Ninth Naval District visited local naval installations and ships.**
- 27 September** **Dr. F. B. Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medicine) began three-day visit to convene annual meeting of Health and Medical Advisory Council.**

- 29 September** 30 members of the Iowa Navy League and ACONA began one week visit to local naval commands.
- 10 October** Brigadier General G. W. Baurin, Belgian Army, Assistant Chief of Staff to NATO's CINCENT visited headquarters.
- 10 October** Major General D. W. Gray, USA, Joint Strategic Survey Council visited staff for conferences.
- 22 October** 20 members of the Tennessee Press Association visited Atlantic Fleet ships and local naval installations.
- 22 October** President of the United States made policy speech on Cuba concerning the naval blockade. News media began filing queries, but because the Cuban operation was a CINCLANT rather than a CINCLANTFLT one, all queries were referred to OSD (PA). CINCLANTFLT personnel augmented to CINCLANT Command Information Bureau.
- 15 November** Admiral Ernesto Giuriati, Chief of the Italian Navy General Staff, visited CINCLANTFLT headquarters for two days.
- 15 November** Members of the Public Relations Society of America made one-day cruise aboard USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN.
- 16 November** Honorable Kenjir Shiga, Director General Japanese Defense Agency, visited CINCLANTFLT headquarters.
- 26 November** President Kennedy visited Cuban operations bases in Southern Georgia and Florida to inspect troops directly involved in the Cuban quarantine operations. CINCLANTFLT information officers helped coordinate public information aspects of visit.
- 18 December** Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations, visited with the Commander in Chief U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
- 10 January 1963** Mr. Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant for National Security to the President, visited CINCLANTFLT headquarters.
- 22 January** Rear Admiral SOSA Rios, Commandant General Venezuelan Navy, arrived for two-day visit to local naval installations
- 29 January** The Honorable Albertis S. Harrison, Governor of Virginia, and Congressional group made one-day cruise in USS ENTERPRISE.

12. During the period of this report, personnel of the Fleet Information Office were assigned Temporary Additional Duty on numerous occasions in order to fulfill their duties.

H. ATHLETICS

1. Forces afloat tournaments were held in the following sports:

| <u>SPORT</u> | <u>WINNER</u> |
|---------------------|----------------------|
| Tennis | SUBLANT |
| Softball | SUBLANT |
| Touch Football | Canceled |
| Volley Ball | FMFLANT |
| Basketball | SUBLANT |
| Bowling | CRUDESLANT |
| Golf | FMFLANT |

There were a total of 135 teams playing the above sports.

2. Five boxers from the LANTFLT represented the South Atlantic Region in the All Navy Boxing Tournament.

3. The Physical Fitness Training and testing has been vigorously pursued in all type commands and is considered an outstanding success.

I. NAVAL LEADERSHIP

1. There is an encouraging trend in the dynamic way in which leadership improvement and the training for it has continued apace in the context of Fleet operations. The initial ground breaking stage has definitely been passed. The program, the goals, and the means are now general knowledge from the first-line supervisors on up. Many of the results do not readily lend themselves to statistical analysis. But those results which are measurable as well as the types of problems being encountered indicate a second stage or follow-on type development. With growing experience in the theoretical study of leadership has come more reliance on mature judgement and values and less reliance on readily available statistics. Advancement from a beginning of no collected material for instruction to suggestions that the material now available be more selective and better organized is an example.

2. The status of Naval Leadership improvement activities of the Naval Type Commanders and significant areas of progress and problems encountered since the last report are summarized below:

a. COMTRALANT reports that Petty Officer Leadership courses at Fleet Training activities continue to be utilized to maximum capacity. Increasing demands by precommissioning details for officer leadership training are being met. TRALANT personnel are regularly scheduled to attend the PO course for refresher leadership training even though they are graduates of the BUPERS Leadership School. The COMTRALANT staff billet for a Leadership Officer was deleted in February 1963 to effect a staff allowance reduction required by CNO, and the allowance for one enlisted leadership instructor at FLTSONARSCOL, KWEST has not been filled.

b. COMCRUDESLANT states that conditions governing the deployment of ships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean permitted the reduction of the deployment period from six to four months; and by assigning a larger number of destroyer squadrons to the rotational pattern the time between deployment can be increased. These two factors will increase the time in homeport which is an important factor in retaining senior personnel. There are ancillary benefits, such as the lesser number of personnel with insufficient obligated service that must be replaced into each deploying group. This will benefit not only the deploying ships but also those from which the personnel must be taken. Also, studies have been conducted to increase the efficiency of the utilization of personnel in CRUDESLANT. These studies were intensified by the reduction in the total number of personnel from allowance to the lesser numbers currently available, called manning level, which is about 95-98% in total number, but are at much lower levels in many of the ratings. These lower levels of personnel manning must inevitably reduce the degree of readiness that can be maintained for protracted periods such as the Cuban Contingency operations. Any effort to maintain a higher level of readiness over a protracted period with the lesser numbers of personnel will result in a reduced readiness of both material and personnel as the time of the operations goes on. The number of personnel at weapons stations will be reduced, during condition watches, since this appears appropriate in the current international situation. The watch stations that are needed for the high degree of readiness in war time conditions but cannot be supported now, will be eliminated. COMCRUDESLANT has discussed this review on the occasion of the TYCOM/OPCOM conferences and at the CO/Unit Commander conferences conducted in the various homeports. There is hope that these efforts to improve the conditions of personnel will have a favorable affect and increase the receptability to the leadership program. COMCRUDESLANT has also continued indoctrination of senior petty officers in career service programs. The goal is to have at least one senior petty officer who has received a five day course of instruction aboard each ship of the Force. During this period, 304 career senior petty officers have

attended the career information and counseling course and have returned to their ships able to intelligently discuss the programs which are available to their men and which will aid in their advancement. A condensed version of this course has been presented to 5,298 officers and men aboard individual ships. The main problem encountered with this program is the paucity of suitable qualified instructors. Eight billets were requested, and seven were authorized, but only six have been filled due to the difficulty of obtaining suitable, highly motivated personnel.

c. COMPHIBLANT has continued his program of leadership seminars and courses established at the PHIBLANT Leadership Academy under the Naval Amphibious Schools. As previously recommended by officers attending the Junior Officers Seminar, a seminar for Executive Officers and Department Heads has been instituted. To date six seminars have been held with 85 in attendance. The two week period between Leadership Academy classes is being utilized for shipboard visits by instructors of the Leadership Academy to assist commanding officers in establishing either leadership classes aboard or by acting in an advisory capacity.

d. COMNAVAIRLANT reports that the past year has shown a marked improvement in the administration and acceptance of the Leadership Program throughout the Force. He states that continuing emphasis should be placed on personal example and a significant greater effort should be directed toward an improvement of personnel management techniques. The NAV-AIRLANT Leadership Course conducted by the four Leadership Centers has been expanded to include basic personnel management techniques; presentations on Navy I & E program and reenlistment incentives such as STAR, SCORE and NESEP; introduction to SEAVEY/SHORVEY, Medicare, Social Security, Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan, and benefits of a Naval Career; and basic principles of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency. The addition of these subjects have materially improved the performance of division officers and heads of department. The introduction of management techniques combined with facts concerning the Navy Reenlistment Program have provided an insight into the enlisted man's world. This is especially beneficial to the young officer in carrying out his duties. Positive results have been achieved in reenlistment through this type of training. Continuing problems encountered by COMNAVAIRLANT are the lack of leadership training aids and constantly increasing numbers of supplementary projects, programs and drives which have created a situation whereby the individual command is forced to spread its efforts extremely thin or to completely ignore certain requirements. He feels that centrally produced films, tapes and flock-board kits pertaining to management techniques, which reflect the language of the fleet and which are directed to the petty officer level will stimulate command efforts; and that a thorough review should be made of all existing time consuming programs with a view toward their consolidation or elimination.

e. COMINLANT states that there is widespread acceptance that the leadership program is permanent and carries demonstrable rewards in efficiency and morale. An addition to the regularly scheduled courses is training in shipboard guided discussions groups.

f. COMSUBLANT is deeply involved in tremendous expansion and growth resulting primarily from the Polaris Program. This rapid growth has naturally generated certain problems related to personnel. COMSUBLANT states that it is evident that through the demonstrated leadership qualities of his officers, petty officers and non-rated men many of these problems have been recognized, attacked and significant progress made toward their solution. He further states that the Polaris Program could not have been so successfully prosecuted without inspirational leadership at every level from the highest government official to the junior seaman in the Force. This quality of leadership continually demonstrated throughout the Force has been the subject of numerous commendable comments from a variety of officials and are a source of pride to the Force Commander. COMSUBLANT's orientation and information programs are directed at both the man and his family, the purpose of which is to instill in the Navy wife a better understanding of her husband's role in the unit and in the Navy.

their rights, privileges and benefits, and the treat to our democratic way of life. A working example of this program occurred during the Cuban Crisis when many SUBLANT units deployed on a few hours notice. Partly as a natural result of this situation, aggravated by sensational and inaccurate press, there was considerable apprehension among the dependents left behind, particularly in the Key West area. In this instance, the close rapport established between the senior unit commanders and dependents permitted prompt and accurate briefings to reassure the dependents. While this action is not directly related to General Order 21, it is this type of sincere concern for the welfare of our personnel and their families that motivates mutual respect, high morale, and a sense of unity within an organization.

g. COMSERVLANT reports that SERVLANT units have continued to prosecute leadership programs utilizing BUPERS Field Teams, Training Courses in homeports and individual shipboard programs. Underway replenishment operations during the recent Cuban Crisis necessitated new replenishment concepts which were a severe test of leadership of Service Force Commanding Officers. Support of the blockade line demanded twenty-four hour/round-the-clock performance of support ships. The successful accomplishment of the task was the result of outstanding inspiration and leadership of the commanding officers and their officers and petty officers. COMSERVLANT notes that it has become increasingly evident that efficient execution of the leadership program requires continuous emphasis to guard against settling into a formalized stereotype routine. Energetic and lively direction through example and practice remains the most effective vehicle.

h. COMASWFORLANT states that all the naval facilities under Commander Oceanographic System, Atlantic, continue to pursue vigorous leadership programs incorporated into "all hands" training lectures. All facilities have graduates aboard from leadership schools who are utilized as instructors and discussion moderators. All petty officers joining the staff are required to attend the one-week leadership school at Norfolk.

i. COMOPTEVFOR, though an operational and not a type commander, reports that he is continuing to prosecute a dynamic leadership program. COMOPTEVFOR held an "open house" to enable all officers and enlisted personnel to acquaint their dependents with working conditions and duties on the staff. COMOPTEVFOR and all division directors gave a brief description of duties of their respective divisions and the film "An Answer" was shown. The sense of personal pride exhibited by personnel and their competitive spirit since the "open house" has been exhilarating. COMOPTEVFOR believes that this area should be explored further to give dependents a better understanding of what their Navy men are doing, and further men's knowledge of how the command operates as a team. The practice of exhibiting movies at the leadership discussions has been curtailed because some of the less experienced discussion leaders were using this device to defeat the purpose of the discussion. Movies are allowed where the discussion leader can follow it by an effective group discussion program.

PART VIII

INTELLIGENCE

A. OPERATIONAL AND CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

1. Operational and current intelligence matters within CINCLANTFLT Staff are closely coordinated with CINCLANT. In keeping with the existing Staff organization, intelligence of these types is processed and disseminated by the same personnel for both CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT, and much of the current intelligence disseminated to fleet commands actually emanates from CINCLANT. The following paragraphs are therefore, in most cases, applicable both to CINCLANT and to CINCLANTFLT. (CONFIDENTIAL)

2. During 1962 significant functional changes were made in the handling and processing of operational intelligence, with the objective of improving the quality of intelligence support provided to CINCLANTFLT, and to senior, adjacent, and subordinate commands. In April the CINCLANT INDICATIONS CENTER was activated, providing this headquarters with a 24 hour intelligence processing and analytical capability, and fulfilling the requirements for active participation by Unified Commanders in the DIA worldwide Indications system. In September the junctions of operational intelligence and special intelligence were merged into a Current Intelligence Section, responsible for processing and dissemination of all current and operational intelligence, and for the operation of the CINCLANT INDICATIONS CENTER. The new arrangements proved highly beneficial during the Cuban crisis of October and November. (SECRET)

3. Current Intelligence is prepared for presentation in periodic Staff briefings, a daily oral briefing for the Commander in Chief, and for inclusion in the CINCLANT Daily Intelligence Summary and other message support intended primarily for the benefit of subordinate commanders. Particular attention is given to provision of current intelligence to the Commanders who serve as Alternate Commander Atlantic (ALTCOMLANT). During late 1962 direct support was provided to commanders involved in Cuban contingency operations and in support of quarantine operations in the Cuban area; the latter support provided the operational intelligence necessary for proper functioning of the quarantine operations. (SECRET)

4. CINCLANT has continued to provide intelligence support for POLARIS submarines. Selected personnel from each POLARIS submarine are given detailed intelligence briefings prior to each patrol. Each POLARIS submarine is also furnished an intelligence support folder containing current information applicable to the area of operations. In addition, operational intelligence is furnished by electrical means during each patrol. (SECRET)

5. The CINCLANT INDICATIONS CENTER participated fully in the worldwide Indications system. As an adjunct to the INDICATIONS CENTER, the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT operational intelligence plot continued to function in support of the OPCON CENTER and subordinate commands. Considerable use was made of the OPCON CENTER 1103A computer; during the quarantine operations of October and November, continuous inputs of intelligence concerning positions and movements of Soviet and bloc merchant ships were made into this computer, and a complete machine tabulation of bloc shipping of interest was obtained and disseminated on a need to know basis every two hours. Continuing use is made of existing computer facilities in order to further the Sea Surveillance concept. (SECRET)

6. The Current Intelligence Section continues to analyze all unidentified submarine contacts in the Atlantic area and to process other available intelligence concerning out of area

Soviet submarine operations, maintaining appropriate plots and historical files. During 1962, 401 submarine contact reports were received and analyzed. Of these reports, 139 (35%) were evaluated as U.S. or friendly submarines, judged to be non-submarines, or were determined to contain insufficient evidence to justify classification. The remaining reports were classified as follows:

- a. Possible Submarine - 66 (16%)
- b. Probable Submarine - 27 (07%)
- c. Positive Submarine - 169 (42%)

Of interest is the large number of positive contacts reported in the Atlantic area during 1962. Most of these positive contacts were obtained during surveillance of the July Soviet Fleet exercise in the Norwegian Sea (149 contacts), or during the Cuban quarantine operations (6 contacts) when for the first time a substantial number of Soviet submarines was detected in the Western Atlantic. (SECRET)

7. The Current Intelligence Section assists in formulating operational intelligence requirements and in planning for CINCLANTFLT units engaged in intelligence collection. In certain cases direct intelligence support is provided for such units. Close liaison is maintained with the CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Operations Division and with the CINCLANT Joint Reconnaissance Center in this regard. (SECRET)

8. The Naval Security Group Interpretative Unit continues to provide current intelligence in support of CINCLANTFLT and subordinate commanders. This unit receives and processes Special Intelligence from world-wide sources. Very close working relationships are maintained between the Interpretative Unit and the Current Intelligence Section. (SECRET)

9. Since mid-1962 some significant trends in intelligence priorities and requirements have become apparent. Current, complete, and accurate information on Soviet Bloc activity has increased in importance as Soviet naval, submarine, and merchant shipping operations in the Atlantic area have grown in scope and intensity. Recent long distance overwater reconnaissance operations by Soviet Long Range Air Force bombers have marked a significant change in Soviet operational patterns, and have resulted in new and urgent requirements for rapid operational intelligence support pertaining to situations in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa are being generated partly due to growing pains in the newly independent countries, but largely as the direct result of continuing penetration and subversion efforts on the part of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Most important however, has been Cuba. Developments since mid-1962, even excluding the period of the October/November crisis, have resulted in greatly increased intelligence requirements on that country. A very substantial collection effort is being made against Cuban targets; this includes an intensive program of aerial reconnaissance which in turn requires considerable direct intelligence support from CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT resources. (SECRET)

10. Particular emphasis has been placed on operational intelligence pertaining to Soviet out of area submarine operations and Soviet/Bloc merchant shipping activity in the Atlantic. These two matters are vital to the Atlantic Fleet, and are therefore accorded continuing and intensive analysis within the Current Intelligence Section. (SECRET)

11. Administration of the Special Intelligence community within the Command has been highlighted by a substantial increase in the size of that community. This increase was due primarily to the same factors cited in the paragraph 9 above. (SECRET)

SECRET

B. ESTIMATES AND PLANS SECTION

1. The intelligence annexes to CINCLANT Operations and War Plans were revised and updated in order to reflect the latest intelligence available. (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. The Atlantic Intelligence Estimate for Planning was reissued in July 1962. This edition included basic intelligence on the USSR and on specific countries in the LANTCOM area subject to contingency planning, viz., Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Iceland. The 1963 ACIP is presently under preparation. (SECRET)
3. A special estimate on possible military operations in Cuba was prepared in September 1962. (SECRET)
4. The Daily Intelligence Summary, in message format, was prepared daily and disseminated to major subordinate commanders as well as superiors. The DIS contained political, operational, technical, order of battle, and sea surveillance intelligence of primary and peripheral interest in the Atlantic Command. Sources used in production of the DIS are departmental level and subordinate commanders' message summaries and selected reports from attaches and other sources. In addition, an intelligence summary was prepared daily for written and oral presentation to CINCLANT and appropriate members of his staff. This responsibility was transferred to the current intelligence section in January 1963. (SECRET)
5. A Caribbean ground order of battle publication covering Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic was published in March 1962 and two complete revisions were issued during the ensuing year. (SECRET)
6. The Cuban Radar Order of Battle was adapted to EAM in June of 1962 and two complete revisions and six interim changes were issued during the year. (CONFIDENTIAL)
7. During the Cuban operation, members of the Estimates and Plans Section were assigned to the Contingency operations section and performed duties in the development and dissemination of intelligence, intelligence briefings and watchstanding in the Joint and CINCLANTFLT War Rooms. (SECRET)
8. A method of covert intelligence collection utilizing the optical range finders of shipborne fire control systems for the acquisition of large scale photography of foreign shipping was developed incident to the Cuban operation. (SECRET)
9. Two special intelligence estimates on Cuba were prepared in March 1963. (SECRET)

C. AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Air Intelligence Representatives participated in HIGH HEELS II, FALLEX, BLUE WATER, and WHIPLASH exercises, the TDI conference at Orlando, Florida, SIOP Approval Conference at Offutt Air Force Base, Atomic Coordination Conference in Washington, D. C., and a Geodesy Conference at NWL Dahlgren. (UNCLASSIFIED)
2. Plans for a new building to house LANTINTCEN were approved which will be implemented when funds are acquired. (UNCLASSIFIED)
3. The Target Data Inventory, National Strategic Target Data Base, National Strategic Target DGZ List, and other SIOP documents were under continued study. (UNCLASSIFIED)

SECRET

4. Target analysts made various studies on Polaris and CVA targeting and employment. (UNCLASSIFIED)
5. Target lists for CINCLANT's Nuclear Weapon Requirement Studies were developed and submitted. (UNCLASSIFIED)
6. Revisions to CINCLANT and CINCLANTFLT Atomic Annexes were made and promulgated. (UNCLASSIFIED)
7. Target systems were developed and coordinated with the "Weight of Effort Control" section of JSTPS for CINCLANT sorties committed to SIOP. (UNCLASSIFIED)
8. Nuclear target lists for SACLANT's OPLAN were developed and submitted.
9. Nuclear Target List developed and submitted for CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316. (CONFIDENTIAL)

D. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION (COLLECTION AND REQUIREMENTS).

1. The Intelligence Acquisition (Collection and Requirements) section authorized in 1961 as augmentation to the CINCLANT JTD was filled in February 1962.
2. Intelligence Acquisition has been conducted in consonance with the DIA system established in June 1962 and is entirely compatible. The Acquisition Section is still in the process of converting CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT collection to the DIA system to include supervision of special intelligence collection. (CONFIDENTIAL)
3. Research, validation, and levying of requirements, as well as monitoring of collections, have been centralized in the Acquisition Section. (CONFIDENTIAL)
4. Promulgation of the CINCLANTFLT Intelligence Collection Plan and the rewrite of Intelligence Collection Instructions to conform with DIA have been accomplished.
5. Machine records (IBM Punch Cards) have been utilized to control and monitor collection. (CONFIDENTIAL)

E. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND DISCLOSURE CONTROL.

1. CINCLANTFLT maintained close liaison with District Intelligence with respect to reporting of possible sabotage or subversive incidents. (CONFIDENTIAL)

PART IX

WAR PLANS AND RELATED MATTERS

A. PLANS - GENERAL. The CINCLANTFLT General War Plan supports the CINCLANT General War Plan and is capable of implementation in case of U. S. unilateral action as in a NATO war. The CINCLANTFLT General War Plan is in consonance with NATO plans and provides for the orderly assignment of national forces to NATO commanders when directed. In addition to the General War Plan, CINCLANTFLT prepares contingency operation plans to support CINCLANT and other unified and specified commanders requiring augmentation of naval forces. For planning the execution of tasks assigned by CINCLANT, CINCLANTFLT who is the Atlantic Command Naval Component Commander, uses the title, "Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Atlantic (CINCNAVLANT)" as established in the unified command plan. For planning the execution of tasks assigned by CNO the title "Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT)" is used.

B. PLANS - STATUS

1. CINCLANTFLT Emergency Evacuation Plan 101-59 is based on and supports CINCLANT Emergency Evacuation Plan 100-62. It provides for the seaborne phase of evacuation operations in support of the cognizant military command ashore. Emergency Evacuation Plan 101-63 is under preparation. (SECRET)
2. CINCLANTFLT Cold War Operation Plan 111-61 supports CINCLANT Cold War Operation Plan 110-61 and provides Cold War guidance for all Atlantic Fleet units. (SECRET)
3. CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 113-60 supports CINCLANT OPLAN 112-60 and provides for the establishment of a VP/SSK antisubmarine surveillance line in the G-I-UK. (SECRET)
4. CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 115-61. This plan provides for reprisal measures at sea against USSR, GDR, or designated Soviet Bloc shipping in varying degrees of severity when necessary to support U. S. political and diplomatic objectives. It supports CINCLANT planning directive 114-61 (Rev). (SECRET)
5. CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 121-61 is a general directive for the guidance of subordinate commanders in planning for the performance of in-port functions necessary to the naval control of shipping in the ports of countries south of the Tropic of Cancer and contiguous to the Caribbean Sea/South Atlantic Ocean. (SECRET)
6. CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 201-60 is the current basic emergency war plan for the U. S. Atlantic Fleet. It is based on the Navy Capabilities Plan, CINCLANT OPLAN 200-62 and other CNO and CINCLANT directives. This plan has been kept current by issuing changes as required. This plan is currently undergoing revision to support CINCLANT OPLAN 200-62 and will be issued as CINCLANTFLT 201-63. (SECRET)
7. CINCLANTFLT General Contingency OPLAN 311-59 supports CINCLANT General Contingency OPLAN 310-62 and provides for the deployment of a Naval Task Force under COMSECONDFLT for operations within the Atlantic Command or in support of adjacent commanders. CINCNAVLANT 311-63 is currently under preparation and will supersede this plan. (SECRET)
8. CINCNAVLANT OPLAN 316-63 supports CINCLANT OPLAN 316-63 and provides for the employment of Naval forces in support of CINCLANT operations in Cuba. (SECRET)

SECRET

9. CINCNAV LANT OPLAN 321-61 provides for the deployment and operations of the U. S. Atlantic Fleet naval forces as required in support of USCINCEUR limited war operations in Morocco. (SECRET)

10. CINCNAV LANT OPLAN 341-61 provides for the employment and logistic support of Atlantic Fleet forces as required in support of CINCNELM for contingency operations in the Middle East. (SECRET)

11. CINCLANTFLT Contingency OPLAN 351-63. This plan provides for LANTCOM augmentation forces in support of CINCARIB Contingency OPLAN 2-61 for contingency operations in Central and South America. (SECRET)

12. CINCLANTFLT Logistic Capabilities Plan-63 (LCP-63) is the third stage logistic capabilities plan which supports the Navy Logistic Capabilities Plan, 1963. This plan amplifies NCLP-63 and contains phased planning information to complement CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 201-60 and CINCLANTFLT contingency plans. (SECRET)

13. Harbor Defense (DIAGONAL) Plans. CINCLANTFLT Instruction 003380, 1D amplifies the mobile harbor defense planning guidance contained in OPNAVINST 00380, 1D. It sets forth the mobile concept for harbor defense within the area of responsibility of CINCLANTFLT, contains guidance for the preparation and review of appropriate DIAGONAL plans and designates the responsibility for preparation of these plans. (SECRET)

14. CINCLANTFLT Disaster Control Plan 1-56. This plan provides for assistance to be rendered to shore activities by Atlantic Fleet operating forces for emergency recovery plus those aspects of disaster control for employment of forces to carry out emergency recovery measures and operations in peace and war. (SECRET)

The terms CINCNAV LANT and CINCLANTFLT refer to the same commander and may be used used interchangeably. (CONFIDENTIAL)

C. OPERATION ORDERS - STATUS

1. CINCLANTFLT OPORD 1-62 is the basic Atlantic Fleet operation order. It covers peacetime operations, Cold War, Limited War, and General War. This order is effective during general emergency conditions and is modified by provisions of CINCLANTFLT OPLAN 201-60 which governs in the event of conflict between OPORDS and OPLANS. (SECRET)

2. CINCLANTFLT OPORD 38-62 covers operations in the Caribbean Sea area and consists of two parts. Part I contains four operations plans and Part II prescribes measures to ensure continuing readiness for immediate deployment of LANTFLT forces. (SECRET)

D. FORMAL PRESENTATIONS. The following formal presentations were made by the CINCLANTFLT presentation section during the period covered by this report.

| | | |
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| 2 July 1962 | Command Organization - Polaris | Congressional Group |
| 3 July 1963 | Command Organization, General War and Contingency Planning | Commanding Officers Reserve Destroyer Escorts |
| 12 July 1962 | Command Organization, General War and Contingency Planning | Mr. J. H. Wakelin, Assistant SECNAV for Research and Development and members Naval Research Advisor Committee |

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| 12 July 1962 | National and NATO Command Organization | Western European Union Parliamentarians |
| 16 July 1962 | Command Organization, General War and Contingency Planning | Armed Forces Reserve Officers |
| 17 July 1962 | Command Organization and Environment | Third Naval District News-men |
| 18 July 1962 | Command Organization, General War and Contingency Planning | ODS/SEC State Guest Cruise |
| 20 July 1962 | Ten Year Plan | Rear Admiral C. K. Bergin, USN |
| 21 July 1962 | Command Organization and Strategy | Congressional Orientation Cruise |
| 24 July 1962 | Command Organization and Strategy | Convoy Commodores Class |
| 25 July 1962 | Command Organization and Strategy | Mr. F. K. SLOAN, Deputy Assistant SECDEF Regional Affairs |
| 31 July 1962 | Command Organization and Forces | Newsmen, Fourth Naval District |
| 3 August 1962 | Command Organization and Strategy | Congressional Group |
| 8 August 1962 | Command Relationships, General War Planning | Rear Admiral George Pittard, COMPHIBGRU FOUR |
| 13 August 1962 | Command Organization and Forces | Vice Admiral Luiz O. Brazil Chief, BUORD, Brazilian Navy |
| 14 August 1962 | Command Organization and Strategy | Mr. W. W. Woodruff, Staff Assistant, Defense Subcommittee, Senate Appropriation Committee |
| 15 August 1962 | Command Organization and Environment, Atlantic Fleet Forces, SOLANT AMITY | Educators, Navy League |
| 16 August 1962 | Command Organization and Forces Status | Dr. Schelling Group DOD International Security Affairs Study Group |
| 17 August 1962 | Command Organization, General War Planning | LtGen G. A. Blake, USAF Director, National Security Agency |
| 21 August 1962 | Command Organization and Forces | Newsmen, Sixth Naval District |

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| 21 August 1962 | CINCLANT Strategic Briefing | State/Defense Exchange Officer Orientation Tour |
| 22 August 1962 | Command Organization for Forces | High School Science Cruise Group |
| 28 August 1962 | Command Organization and Forces | Newsmen, Eighth Naval District |
| 28 August 1962 | CINCLANT General War and Contingency Plans | GEN Maxwell Taylor, USA Chairman Joint Chief of Staff |
| 29 August 1962 | Command Organization and Forces | American Ordnance Association |
| 4 September 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Strategy - ALTCOMLANT | Rear Admiral J. R. Lee, USN, COMCARDIV 16 |
| 7 September 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Strategy | Congressional Group |
| 10 September 1962 | Atlantic Command Orientation | NATO Parliamentarians |
| 12 September 1962 | Atlantic Command Orientation | French Association for the Atlantic Community |
| 15 September 1962 | Atlantic Command NATO Relationships | The Right Honorable Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Defense of the U. K. |
| 17 September 1962 | Atlantic Command Orientation | Mr. Arthur Conte, President Western European Union Assembly |
| 18 September 1962 | Atlantic Command Orientation Strategy, SOLANT AMITY | Mr. G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. |
| 26 September 1962 | Local Environment Atlantic Command Organization Atlantic Fleet Operations | Iowa Navy League |
| 28 September 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Forces Atlantic Fleet Operations | Dr. Frank B. Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary Defense (Health and Medicine) and Civilian Health and Medicine Council |
| 3 October 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Strategy - ALTCOMLANT | COMCARDIV 18 |
| 8 October 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Strategy - ALTCOMLANT | COMPHIBLANT |

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| 9 October 1962 | Local Environment, Atlantic Command Organization, Atlantic Fleet Operations | NATO Journalists |
| 10 October 1962 | Local Environment, Command Organization, Fleet Operations | West Virginia Navy League |
| 11 October 1962 | Atlantic Command Orientation | GEN De Brigade G. W. Baurin, Belgian Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, CINCENT |
| 17 October 1962 | Ten Year Plan for Puerto Rico | RADM L. C. Coxe, USN, Inspector General and Assistant Chief Bureau of Docks |
| 18 October 1962 | Atlantic Command Orientation and Planning | RADM J. T. B. Munter, Royal Danish Navy, Commander in Chief Danish Forces, Greenland |
| 18 October 1962 | The Unified Command Atlantic | American Ordnance Association |
| 19 October 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Strategy | MGEN B. P. Johnson, USA Chief of Staff CONARC |
| 27 October 1962 | Plans for Cuban Operations | The Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| 8 November 1962 | OPLANS 312-316 Missions, Concepts, and Forces | OPLAN 312-316 Conferees |
| 13 November 1962 | OPLANS 312-316 | Dr. J. H. ENGEL, Director OEG |
| 15 November 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Forces - Cuban Operations | CONARD |
| 16 November 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Forces | Japanese Minister of Defense |
| 26 November 1962 | Cuban Operations | President Kennedy |
| 28 November 1962 | U.S. and NATO Commands, Atlantic and Europe Rota Spain Facilities | The Secretary of the Navy |
| 30 November 1962 | Atlantic Command Organization and Forces, Cuban Operations | Naval War College |
| 4 December 1962 | The New Navy | First Class Midshipmen |
| 6 December 1962 | Atlantic Command Strategy ALTCOMLANT Briefing | COMCARDIV 14 |

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| 10 December 1962 | Command Organization | Radio-TV Newsmen |
| 11 December 1962 | The U. S. Atlantic Fleet | Naval War College |
| 17 December 1962 | Atlantic Command Strategy Cuban Operations | C. I. A. Naval Reserve Unit |
| 9 January 1963 | The Atlantic Command in General or Limited War | Mr. Carl Kaysen, Deputy Special Assistant to the President (National Security) |
| 21 January 1963 | The Atlantic Command in General or Limited War CINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT Relationships with the NMCS | National Military Commands Systems Group (DOD) |
| 22 January 1963 | Atlantic Command and Atlantic Organization and Forces | RADM Ricardo Sosa RIOS, Venezuelan Navy |
| 22 January 1963 | Military Command Relationships | Mr. Edward A. Jamison, Political Advisor CINCLANT/SACLANT |
| 23 January 1963 | Cuban Operations | Faculty, Armed Forces Staff College |
| 29 January 1963 | The Atlantic Command in General or Limited War | Governor Albertis Harrison |
| 30 January 1963 | The Atlantic Command in General or Limited War | Members DOD and AEC |
| 30 January 1963 | The Atlantic Command in General or Limited War | Congressional Group |
| 30 January 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Quarantine Operations | Third Class Midshipmen U.S. N.A. |
| 6 February 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Quarantine Operations | News Media from 9th and 5th Naval Districts |
| 11 February 1963 | The Atlantic Command Cuban Operations | National War College |
| 17 February 1963 | The Atlantic Command Cuban Operations | Congressional Army Reserve Unit |
| 18 February 1963 | The Atlantic Command in General and Limited War Cuban Operations | Department of State Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy |
| 19 February 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Quarantine Operations | Allied Officer Group Marine Corps Schools |
| 23 February 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Operations | Congressional Group Visit to Guantanamo |

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| 26 February 1963 | Atlantic Fleet Commitments and War Plans | Naval War College |
| 28 February 1963 | Atlantic Fleet Commitments and War Plans Cuban Operations | Congressional Group |
| 4 March 1963 | The Atlantic Command in General and Limited War | Argentine National War College |
| 11 March 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Operations | MGEN J. J. DAVIS, USA, Assistant Director, NSA |
| 12 March 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Quarantine Operations | Confederation of Inter-Allied Reserve Officers |
| 13 March 1963 | Command Organization | CAPT N. M. Hershey, USN Mr. E. M. Rabenold, FSO-2 |
| 13 March 1963 | The Atlantic Command Cuban Quarantine Operations | The Propeller Club of Newport News |
| 22 March 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Operations | Congressional Group |
| 25 March 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Quarantine Operations | ADM Hernan Cubillos, Chilean Navy |
| 25 March 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Quarantine Operations | Michigan ACONA Navy League |
| 27 March 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Quarantine Operations | French War College |
| 28 March 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Operations | U. S. Junior Foreign Service Officers |
| 28 March 1963 | Command Organization Cuban Quarantine Operations | U. S. Naval Academy Alumni |